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UNLIMITED VINDICATION: CHOOSING
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN THE ERA OF
CONSTRAINED PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Patricia Youngblood Reyhan*

INTRODUCTION
Personal jurisdiction defines the circumstances in which a state is
constitutionally permitted to exercise judicial power over a defendant.1 Once a state
has personal jurisdiction, it has expansive but not unlimited legislative jurisdiction2
to apply its substantive law to claims before it.3 A state with personal jurisdiction
also has essentially unlimited power to apply its procedural laws to such claims.4 The
power of a state to apply its procedural laws is consequential to a number of issues5
but to none more so than the choice of its own statute of limitations to either bar or
permit plaintiff’s suit. As the forum, a state with personal jurisdiction over the
defendant thus may advance the sovereign interests reflected in its limitations period,
whether those interests favor vindication for the plaintiff or repose for the defendant,
without regard to the strength of the sovereign interests of other states. Because this
power of choice lies exclusively with the forum state6 the question of the connection
a state must have with the defendant in order to be a constitutionally-permissible
*
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1. Personal or judicial jurisdiction refers to the power of a state to hear a case against a defendant in
its own courts. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 24–79 (AM. LAW INST.
1971) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)). For purposes of this Article, personal jurisdiction and
judicial jurisdiction are used interchangeably.
2. Legislative jurisdiction as here used refers not to the power of a governmental entity to enact law
but rather to the “power of a state to apply its law to create or affect legal interests.” Willis L.M. Reese,
Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1978). When a state has legislative jurisdiction,
it is constitutionally empowered to choose and apply its own law. See id.
3. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (Brennan, J., plurality) (“[F]or a
State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”) (emphasis added); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (adopting the Allstate standard).
4. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (holding that there was no
constitutional impediment to a state choosing its longer limitations period even if the state whose law
created the cause of action would bar plaintiff’s claims).
5. Other rules widely considered to be procedural include those related to service of process,
pleading, burdens of proof, sufficiency of evidence, and notice and proof of foreign law. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, at ch. 6.
6. McCarrell v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 153 A.3d 207, 215 (N.J. 2017) (noting that when suit is
brought in New Jersey, its courts apply New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules in deciding whether its or
another state’s statute of limitations governs the matter).
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forum choice, that is to have judicial jurisdiction, is determinative of whether the
state has the power to choose its statute of limitations.
From the United States Supreme Court’s 1877 decision in Pennoyer v. Neff7
to its 1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington8 the judicial jurisdiction
of American courts was constrained by the requirement that a nonresident9 defendant
who had not consented to suit in a state must be present there in either person or
property. Thus, the only possible fora for suit against a defendant, in the absence of
consent, were the state of defendant’s residence, the state of the location of
defendant’s property, and the state where defendant was personally served with
process. If a defendant remained in his state of residence and owned no property
outside of that state, not an unusual circumstance in mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth
century America, there was only one forum available for plaintiff’s suit and,
according to the then-prevailing lex fori10 rule, only one statute of limitations, the
forum’s, that governed plaintiff’s suit. If the limitations period were closed there,
defendant would enjoy repose. That result followed even if defendant had caused
injury to plaintiff in plaintiff’s domicile and that state’s limitations period remained
open. Correspondingly, if the statute of limitations of defendant’s domicile remained
open and the statute of limitations of plaintiff’s domicile had closed, plaintiff gained
the possibility of vindication from defendant’s domicile that would not be available
in her own. Whether the repose of the defendant or the vindication of the plaintiff
won the day turned entirely on the forum and the forum was determined by tight
standards of judicial jurisdiction and not by plaintiff’s choice.
International Shoe brought a sea change in the constitutional limitations on
the power of states to hear claims against nonresident, non-present defendants. It
unmoored jurisdiction from physical presence and allowed a state to exercise
jurisdiction in any instance where the defendant had “minimum contacts” with it.11
Where Pennoyer tightly constrained jurisdiction, International Shoe expanded it and,
in so doing, offered plaintiff an opportunity to choose among all states with which
the defendant had constitutionally-sufficient contacts. With the choice of fora came
the possibility, if not likelihood, of different limitations periods reflecting different
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (discussed infra notes 61 and 62).
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (discussed infra notes 63–77).
9. Even in the Pennoyer era domicile, and later, residence formed a constitutionally permissible
basis for the exercise of judicial power over a defendant. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64
(1940). A defendant’s domicile is “where he has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal
establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 8th ed. 1883). Every person
has one and only one domicile. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 11. Although domicile has the
dual requirement of a “home” and an intention, residence lacks the intention element. See id. at § 30 cmt.
a. A person’s residence is simply a place where she has a dwelling and thus a significant connection;
residency in a state does not “require the existence of an attitude of mind similar to that required for the
acquisition of a domicile of choice.” Id. The connection of residence must be more than briefly transitory,
however. See id. A business entity’s domicile is the place where it establishes its legal existence, as in the
place of incorporation or formation. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). Its residence, for
jurisdictional purposes, is the locale of its principal place of business. See id. (holding that California did
not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant) (discussed infra notes 176–91).
10. The near universal rule of the time was that the forum applied its own procedural rules, including
its statute of limitations. See discussion infra notes 103–05.
11. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
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calibrations of the plaintiff’s vindication and the defendant’s repose interests.
Suddenly, plaintiff had a powerful motive to “shop” for a forum that would permit
her to bring her claim and to avoid all fora that would not. As long as the chosen
forum had judicial jurisdiction over the defendant and a statute of limitations that
remained open, plaintiff had an avenue for vindication of her rights, whether or not
her own domicile, defendant’s domicile, or the place where her claim arose saw fit
to leave that avenue open. Defendant, once effectively able to rely on his own
domicile’s repose protection, now found that he knew no repose as long as one state
with jurisdiction over him had determined to favor the plaintiff’s vindication
interest.12
The intersection of the exercise of expansive judicial jurisdiction and the
choice of the procedural lex fori did not escape the impassioned criticism of courts
and commentators.13 At the height of the expansive exercise of judicial jurisdiction
and before the United States Supreme Court again constrained that exercise,14 states
began to rethink the propriety of the reflexive choice of their own statute of
limitations, especially where that choice did not serve the interests of the forum and
disserved the interests of other states more connected to the dispute. This rethinking
was most pronounced with respect to the then-typical circumstance where the
forum’s limitations period was open and all other interested states’ periods were
closed, the forum had no particular sovereign interest in favoring the vindication
interests of the plaintiff, and other states had significant interests in favoring the
repose interests of the defendant. The lex fori rule was a common law product and
judges, seeing modern reasons to change it, did so by adopting choice-of-limitations
methods that were far more nuanced and sensitive to the sovereign interests of all the
states with a connection to the parties and the claims.15 The intended and actual effect
was to constrain plaintiff’s forum shopping by insuring that a limitations bar,
favoring the repose of defendant, would be chosen by a forum with a vindicationfavoring rule when that forum had no particular reason in an individual case to favor
vindication, as where the plaintiff was a nonresident. Judicial jurisdiction continued
to be expansive; the procedural consequences, at least with respect to limitations
periods, were harnessed.
Significantly, however, in four cases decided between 2010 and 2018, the
United States Supreme Court substantially constrained the circumstances in which a
state is constitutionally permitted to exercise judicial power over a defendant.
Expansive judicial jurisdiction is now gone and with it the opportunity for the
plaintiff to engage in any broad form of forum shopping.16
12. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (discussed infra notes 90–95).
13. See infra note 107.
14. See discussion infra Section IV.
15. See infra Section III.
16. The Supreme Court actually decided six jurisdiction cases in this period. Because two of them,
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (holding that Nevada did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant) and BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (holding that Montana did not have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant), did not significantly change jurisdictional analysis in a way not
captured by the other four, only the latter are analyzed in this Article. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (holding that California did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant) (discussed infra notes 194–200); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014)
(holding that California did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant) (discussed infra notes 176–
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Clearly, with the new constraints in place, the primary goal, curtailment of
forum shopping, that drove states’ adoption of flexible and nuanced choice-of-law
methods to determine the governing limitations period, is met. Those methods, in
conjunction with newly-restricted judicial jurisdiction, now consistently advance the
repose interest of the defendant over the vindication interests of the plaintiff. PostDaimler AG v. Bauman, plaintiff has lost a significant choice of fora for her suit; as
a consequence of the modern choice-of-limitations rules adopted in the International
Shoe age, she has lost the opportunity in many cases to have her suit heard at all.
This Article examines the intersection of the constitutional constraints on
judicial jurisdiction and the choice-of-law models currently employed to determine
whether to bar or permit plaintiff’s suit. Section I describes the practice and purposes
of states in adopting statutes of limitations, first with respect to domestic concerns
and then with respect to multistate cases. Section II overviews the expansion of
judicial jurisdiction from International Shoe to Daimler and the forum-shopping
consequences of that expansion. Section III explains the methods historically and
modernly used by states to choose between conflicting limitations periods in
multistate cases. Section IV briefly examines the recent Supreme Court cases, each
of which constricted the circumstances under which a state court is constitutionally
permitted to exercise judicial jurisdiction. Section V demonstrates the current
consequences of the intersection between modern constraints on jurisdiction and the
limitations on vindication interests that are the intentional product of modern choiceof-limitations models. Section VI concludes with a proposed rule that calls for the
forum to choose the longer of the limitations period of the defendant’s domicile or
the place where the cause of action arose in order to balance more appropriately the
docket, repose, deterrence and vindication interests underlying competing limitations
periods in the era of constrained judicial jurisdiction.
I. CHOOSING STATUTES OF LIMITATION
A. The Source, Function and Purpose of Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations reflect “[a] legislature’s attempt to achieve a balance
among State interests in protecting both forum courts and defendants against stale
claims and in insuring a reasonable period during which plaintiffs may seek recovery
on otherwise sound causes of action.”17 These sovereign interests, which focus on
the forum, the defendant, and the plaintiff, are here referred to respectively as docket
interests, repose and deterrence interests, and vindication interests.

191); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (holding that North
Carolina did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendants) (discussed infra notes 167–73); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (holding that New Jersey did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant) (discussed infra notes 160–64).
17. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1192 (N.H. 1998); see also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 603 cmt. a (1934) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST)) (“[T]he policy of
a statute of limitations is to confine actions in the local courts to a period within which it is believed
substantial justice between the parties can be administered.”)
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Each state is entitled to weigh these interests and to calibrate the balance
among them as it sees fit without constitutional constraints limiting its evaluation.18
There is, in fact, wide variance in the outcomes states have reached in striking the
balance between defendant’s repose and plaintiff’s vindication. State statutes
limiting actions sounding in either contract or tort range from one year19 to fifteen
years.20 Sovereign interests may push a state to enact a shorter limitations period for
broad classes of cases and yet serve as the motivation for choosing a longer
limitations period in unique cases.21 Sovereign interests may equally underlie
generally longer limitations periods with shorter periods in exceptional instances
where those interests tug in a different direction.22 Just as the limitations periods
themselves vary considerably, the events that trigger the running of the limitations

18. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (holding that the forum did not
violate constitutional constraints in choosing its own statute of limitations to a substantive claim governed
by the law of another state whose limitations period had run). While the United States Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality of the forum’s choice, many commentators have suggested that due process
concerns should render the choice unconstitutional in any situation where the forum has no substantial
connection with the parties or transaction, the application of its law is grounded only in the fact that it is
deemed “procedural,” and the application of its law is potentially outcome-determinative. See, e.g., James
A. Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in the Conflict of Laws, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 405, 417–
18 (1980). Only if the forum could show service of a significant local policy, difficult in this context,
would the choice be permissible. See id.
19. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-541 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of
the 54th Legis.) (contract claims); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Reg.
Sess. of the 26th Legis.) (UCC claims).
20. See e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.090 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 5 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.)
(written contracts executed before July 15, 2014). For contracts under seal only, Massachusetts retains a
twenty-year limitations period. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 30
of the 2020 Second Ann. Sess.).
21. For example, Delaware’s general statute of limitations in contracts actions is three years and yet
when it desired to incentivize foreign parties in high-dollar contracts to choose both Delaware courts and
Delaware law for the resolution of any disputes arising from those contracts, Delaware provided for a 20year limitations period if the parties adopt such a term in a contract involving at least $100,000. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 236 of the 150th Gen. Assembly (2019-2020)).
States have enacted exceptions to their general torts limitations period, creating longer limitations periods
for sexual harassment or sexual assault. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208(b) (McKinney, Westlaw through
L.2019, Ch. 758 & L.2020, Ch. 23) (a person who is the victim of sexual abuse as a child can bring a
lawsuit for money damages against the abuser or the institution that enabled the abuse until the victim
reaches the age of 55).
22. A common example is a shorter limitations period for libel or slander actions than for other torts.
Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-102 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) (imposing a
two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-103
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) (subjecting inter alia libel and slander to a one-year limitations
period). Another example is presented by limitations periods applicable against governmental entities as
defendants that are shorter than the periods applicable to non-governmental defendants. Compare N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1976) (imposing a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions), with
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (1977) (imposing a two-year period for suit against New Mexico
governmental entities rather than the three-year generally-applicable period).
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period23 and the circumstances when the running of the periods is tolled24 vary
widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Especially significant to the analysis of this
Article is the existence of borrowing statutes in most states, rules that direct the
choice of another state’s limitations period in certain instances, and the wide
variations as to what those instances are.25
The desire to eliminate stale or fraudulent claims is the oldest26 and most
commonly-referenced policy goal behind drawing the line in favor of a relativelyshorter limitations period.27 This purpose advances the repose interests of the
defendant and the docket interests of the forum. Barring stale claims saves the
defendant from evidentiary disadvantages created by a dilatory plaintiff.28 As one
court put it, statutes of limitation “afford parties needed protection against the
necessity of defending claims which, because of their antiquity, would place the
defendant at a grave disadvantage.”29 The same bar advances the orderly
administration of justice in a state, the docket interest, by preserving the state’s
judicial resources for those cases in which the plaintiff has shown the requisite
attention and in which the evidence has not been made more challenging for the
parties and the court by the sheer passage of time. “The statutes are predicated on the

23. In a contracts context, compare Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291, 1301
(1st Cir. 1988) (under New York law, statute of limitations does not begin to run until depositor has made
a demand for payment on the bank), with Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.
2006) (under California law, limitations period begins to run when plaintiff could or should have made
the demand). In a torts context, see McCarrell v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 153 A.3d 207, 212 (N.J. 2017)
(comparing New Jersey’s “discovery rule” delaying the beginning of the limitations period with
Alabama’s lack of such a rule).
24. See Hatfield v. Halifax PLC, 564 F.3d 1177, 1182–85 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussion of English and
California tolling rules).
25. See discussion infra notes 109–17.
26. See The Act of Limitation with a Proviso 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 2 (“Forasmuch as the time of
limitation appointed for suing . . . extend, and be of so far and long time past, that it is above the
remembrance of any living man, truly to try and know the perfect certainty of such things, as hath or shall
come in trial . . . to the great danger of mens consciences that have or shall be impanelled in any jury for
the trial of the same.”).
27. See, e.g., Cameron v. Hardisty, 407 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Iowa 1987) (applying Iowa limitations
period based on Iowa’s “primary interest in protecting its courts and litigants from stale claims”). At early
common law, there was not a fixed time to bring an action because the life of the suit was generally
defined by the lifetimes of the parties. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 248 N.E.2d 871,
872 (N.Y. 1969).
28. See, e.g., Flanagan, 248 N.E.2d at 872 (“The Statute of Limitations was enacted to afford
protection to defendants against defending stale claims after a reasonable period of time had elapsed
during which a person of ordinary diligence would bring an action. The statutes embody an important
policy of giving repose to human affairs.”). Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson put the concern this
way: “Statutes of limitations . . . in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944).
29. Wilkinson v. Harrington, 243 A.2d 745, 752 (R.I. 1968); see also Order of R.R. Telegraphers,
321 U.S. at 349 (“The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on
notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes
to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”).
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reasonable and fair presumption that valid claims which [are of value] are not
generally left to gather dust or remain dormant for long periods of time.”30
Limitations periods, particularly relatively longer ones, also reflect a
sovereign concern with the vindication of plaintiff’s rights, a concern that is as
important as the efficient functioning of a court system and the protection of
defendants.31 Vindication interests are often unrecognized or unexamined in probing
the purposes behind the adoption of a particular statute of limitations rule.32 While
there are doubtless myriad reasons for this, the one that particularly suggests itself is
that statutes of limitations, by their very name, suggest an intent to limit rather than
to allow. While this was the motivation for setting a limitations period for plaintiff’s
suit, it was not the sole motivation for the choice of how long that period was to be.
Thus, a sovereign’s choice of a generous period reflects in part a recognition that
plaintiffs need a reasonable time to identify and understand their injury33 and to act
on that knowledge before suit should be foreclosed.34 Delay is not always the
conscious sacrifice or disregard of a claim for vindication. Among factors potentially
influencing delay are the plaintiff’s state of knowledge, the consequence of the injury
itself,35 efforts at extra-judicial resolution, lack of resources, and lack of access to
legal services are now far more likely to be the determinants of when plaintiffs
ultimately file suit. Nonetheless, the vindication interest of the plaintiff often is either
discounted or ignored altogether in courts’ consideration of whether to choose the
limitations period of a state that is different in length and effect than the forum’s
limitations period.36
The fourth interest that may underlie a state’s enactment of a longer
limitations period, the deterrence interest, is one in which the interests of the forum,
the defendant and the plaintiff intersect.37 This interest focuses on the forum’s

30. Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25, 36 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Renner v. Edwards, 475 P.2d 530,
532–33 (Idaho 1969)); see also Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (“[T]he
courts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.”).
31. See, e.g., Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (“This policy of repose, designed to protect the defendants, is
frequently outweighed . . . where the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s rights.”).
32. See, e.g., Wm. Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals: Rethinking How Choice-ofLaw Regimes Approach Statutes of Limitations, 65 SYRACUSE. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (2015) (describing
the purposes behind statutes of limitations as ensuring fairness for the defendant, ensuring courts have
reliable evidence upon which to decide cases, and ensuring vigilance by plaintiffs).
33. See e.g., Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debate, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 683,
687. (“Especially short periods of limitation or periods set without regard to the plaintiff’s state of
knowledge might be seen as undermining the policies supporting the right sued on, undercutting general
policies supporting the whole field of law, or negating procedural policies favoring access to courts, trial
by jury, rights to notice and hearing, and so forth.”).
34. See e.g., McGee v. Arkel Int’l, LLC, 671 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 2012) (plaintiffs should not be
considered guilty of procrastination because they would not know the details of the alleged tortious actors
and conduct until the completion of a protracted military investigation).
35. See Gary L. Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts Between Statutes of Limitations, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1–2 (1976) (discussing the personal impact of thalidomide damage to children in Canada
and the effect of Quebec’s one-year statute of limitations); see also Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975).
36. See discussion infra note 138 and text following note 225.
37. See Andersen v. Lopez, 957 N.E.2d 726, 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (noting that in enacting its
limitations period for torts claims the Massachusetts legislature had determined that that period was “an
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concern that defendants either domiciled in or acting within the state not conduct
themselves in ways that predictably may cause either ex contractu or ex delicto38
injury. By denying defendant repose for a relatively longer period, the forum’s
limitations period can be seen as an incentive to defendants’ careful conduct both
within and without the forum.39 Much as is true of the vindication interest, however,
the deterrence interest of a state is often submerged by considerations of repose,
especially where the defendant is a forum domiciliary and the legal claim of the
plaintiff accrued outside the forum.40
As a general matter, the forum has an interest in the legal protection or legal
exposure of defendants and in the opportunity for a plaintiff to pursue legal recovery
and has struck the balance between the two through the adoption of a particular set
of limitations rules. The weight of these interests, unlike the forum’s docket control
interests, will change with the domicile of the parties. A state’s docket interests are
implicated simply by virtue of the state being the forum and are completely irrelevant
if the state is not the forum. A state’s interest in providing a plaintiff an opportunity
for recovery by not foreclosing her suit on limitations grounds is stronger if the
plaintiff is a forum resident and the forum’s statute of limitations has not run.41
Correspondingly, a forum’s interest in keeping its courts open for a non-domiciliary
plaintiff against a domiciliary defendant is generally not of paramount concern to the
forum if the plaintiff’s domicile would have closed its courts to her.42 It is perfectly
within a legislature’s or court’s prerogative to make a choice among competing
limitations periods adopted by different states, where presented, based upon the
forum’s perception of the effect of the domicile of the parties and the locus of the
appropriate balance between the length of time its citizens should remain accountable for the
consequences of their negligent conduct and the protection they need against ‘protracted exposure to
liability’” (quoting Nierman v. Hyatt Corp., 808 N.E.2d 290, 293 (Mass. 2004))).
38. Lawyers and legal academics historically favored Latin legal phrases; as will soon be evident,
lawyers and legal academics engaged in analyzing multistate cases presenting “Conflicts of Law” still do.
Consuetudinis magna vis est.
39. An excellent example is provided by DeLoach v. Alfred, 960 P.2d 628 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc).
DeLoach involved a California plaintiff, an Arizona defendant, and an accident occurring in Tennessee
with a Tennessee driver who was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Arizona courts. Id. at 629.
Arizona’s limitations period was open, Tennessee’s was closed. Id. Arizona’s Supreme Court focused on
Arizona’s deterrence interest, stating:
Arizona’s two-year statute reflects the substantial interest underlying its policy
requiring its citizens to answer for the harm they cause. . . . Arizona courts have long
recognized that, in addition to making injured plaintiffs whole, holding tortfeasors
accountable also advances the important interest in deterring wrongful conduct. . . .
Thus the policy of deterrence extends to providing a forum for redress against Arizona
defendants for their negligent conduct outside the state.
Id. at 631–32. See also Resner v. Owners Ins. Co., No. CA 2001 0091, 2002 WL 236970, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 14, 2002) (despite the fact that the plaintiff was a non-Ohio resident suing an Ohio resident,
Ohio’s longer limitations period was chosen because the state had an interest in ensuring that its
domiciliary defendants “are acting in a manner so as not to cause injury or damage to the public”).
40. See discussion infra notes 207–17.
41. As discussed in Section IV¸ recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court constricting the
exercise of general jurisdiction over defendants have resulted in significantly fewer instances when
plaintiff’s state of residence is constitutionally allowed to hear the case against a non-present defendant.
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915 (2011).
42. See discussion infra notes 215–16.

434

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 3

claim on the sovereign interests underlying those competing periods.43 Part B
examines the general effects of multistate contacts on the question of which
limitations period, that of the forum or that of another state, is to be chosen.
B. The Presence of Conflicts of Law Regarding Limitations Periods
Part A establishes that states can and do select very different limitations
periods to govern the timeliness of claims brought before their courts. When a case
before it involves only domestic parties and a transaction that has occurred wholly
intrastate, the forum court simply must pick which of the forum’s limitations rules
governs.44 Increasingly common, however, are cases where the parties and
occurrences relevant to the suit are connected to multiple states and nations. When
such “foreign”45 connections are present, the prospect of a conflict of law is also
present and the forum court may find itself asked to apply not its forum rule but a
rule adopted by a foreign jurisdiction. Conflicts of law arise in nearly every realm of
civil law and courts have developed sophisticated conflict-of-law rules and
methods46 to identify and resolve them.47
What is meant here by conflict-of-law rules and methods? A good starting
point is section 1 of the First Restatement: conflicts rules are “[t]hat part of the law
of each state which determines whether in dealing with a legal situation the law of
some other state will be recognized, be given effect or be applied. . . . “48 Three
aspects of this statement deserve attention here. First, when speaking of a conflictof-law or choice-of-law rule we are dealing with a rule or law of a given state49 that,

43. See discussion infra note 58.
44. This is not always an easy task. Courts are frequently faced with causes of action that appear to
fall in one legal category, ex delicto, but are pled as falling into another legal category, ex contractu, or
vice versa. Often the driving reason for the recharacterization of the claim is to gain an open limitations
period for claims pled in one legal silo, most often in contract, where the claim facially appears more
appropriately pled in another, most often in tort, where the statute of limitations has run. See, e.g.,
Precision Gear Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 135 So.3d 953, 954 (Ala. 2013) (involving the question of
whether an indemnification claim sounded in tort, for which Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations
would apply, or in quasi-contract, for which Alabama’s six-year period would apply).
45. In Conflicts parlance, “foreign” simply means non-forum and does not necessarily connote
foreignness in the conventional sense of “non-national.” For Conflicts purposes, in forty-nine states Utah
is as “foreign” as Uzbekistan. See Foreign, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
46. In this Article, unless the context suggests otherwise, “conflict of law” and “choice of law” are
used interchangeably to describe issues surrounding the question of which of two or more laws sourced
in different jurisdictions and differing in content and outcome is to be chosen.
47. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explain in depth the different general choice-of-law rules
and methods that have been adopted by states, except as necessary to understand the choice-of-law
approach a state will use in resolving a conflict regarding limitations periods. Two such methods, one
based on the Restatement Second and the other, “government interest analysis”, will deserve significant
exploration in that regard. See discussion infra notes 118–86 and 143–52. For a brief description of the
prevailing general methods for choosing substantive law, see Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, Choice of
What? The New York Court of Appeals Defines the Parameters of Choice-of-Law Clauses in
Multijurisdictional Cases, 82 ALB. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 n.n21–24 (2019).
48. RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 17, § 1.
49. A word on the use of the word “state.” As used generally in Conflicts literature and in this Article,
the term “state” is employed as a generic term to cover any “territorial unit with a distinct general body
of law.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 3. For purposes here, those units may be a state of the
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like any other rule or law, is either enacted by a legislature or announced by a court.
Second, although the source of the law is similar to other laws, its effect is entirely
different, directing a process of law selection that will often choose applicable rules
sourced in a foreign state.50 For this reason, conflict-of-law or choice-of-law rules
have been called “indicative” rather than “dispositive” law.51 It is in the nature of
such rules that they do not determine the merits of a case. Instead these rules choose
or “indicate” the law that will govern that determination, the dispositive rules. Where
a conflicts rule so directs, the courts of the forum apply the law of another sovereign.
In most instances, it is the responsibility of the party seeking the choice of “foreign”
law to plead and prove the content and purpose of that law.52
Finally, although the term “conflict of laws” is defined as the choice among
laws sourced in more than one jurisdiction, there is a narrower sense in which the
term is often used and will be used in this Article. A “conflict of law” in practice
comes into play only when the following prerequisites are present: there the two or
more states with a claim to the choice of their legal rule, the competing rules are
different, and most significantly, the difference makes a difference. The final
requirement, that the difference make a difference, is what truly creates a “conflict”
of law requiring courts to engage in “conflict” resolution.53 If State A has a
limitations period of two years and State B has a limitations period of four years, one
might say there is a conflict, but in fact, there is only a difference. Should the plaintiff
bring suit in one year or in five, the difference will not matter as the case in the first
instance can proceed under either rule and in the second instance will be barred by
both rules.54 Only where the plaintiff has sued after two and before four years will
the choice matter and therefore will a conflict exist.

United States, the United States itself or a foreign nation or political subdivision thereof. Often this Article
will refer to “state interests.” That concept also has a meaning inclusive of foreign national interests.
50. Conflict-of-law inquiries are essentially directed to “the operative effect at the forum of foreign
law because of a foreign fact element in the case.” GEORGE WILFRED STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (2d ed. 1951).
51. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & CHRISTOPHER A.
WHYTOCK, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1067–68 (6th ed. 2018).
52. See Hatfield v. Halifax PLC, 564 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing parties’ failure to
prove the content of England’s tolling statute). Where the content of foreign law is ambiguous, however,
such that a party cannot prove its precise contours, courts will often lend their assistance. See, e.g., Rocky
Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 24 F.3d 125, 128 (10th Cir. 1994) (federal
court, applying Utah’s choice-of-law rules which chose Texas law, endeavored to determine whether
Texas would recognize interspousal immunity where Texas law was unclear on the point).
53. Where it is determined that a difference in law makes no difference with regard to the resolution
of an issue, that is, where there is no conflict, the forum will typically choose its own rule. See Woodward
v. Taylor, 366 P.3d 432, 434 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (holding that because there was no conflict between
the substantive rule of Washington, the place of domicile of the parties, and Idaho, the place of the
accident, forum law was to be chosen). This may have both direct and indirect consequences for selection
of the governing limitations rule. For example, in Woodward, the determination that forum law governed
the substance of the case drove the conclusion that the forum’s longer statute of limitations should govern
the case as well. Id. at 438. See also discussion infra notes 142–45.
54. See, e.g., Grothe v. Grothe, No. 109,002, 2014 WL 5801003, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2014)
(holding that a choice between the limitations periods of the two connected states was unnecessary under
the forum’s borrowing statute because the action was timely under the laws of both states).
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In the United States, most choice-of-law rules are the product of common
law development.55 Two states, Louisiana and Oregon, have codified their choiceof-law regime, Louisiana entirely and Oregon as to torts and contracts conflicts
only.56 A number of other states have enacted targeted statutory rules to achieve
certain outcomes when two or more states with conflicting rules have connections to
the case. Common among these are borrowing statutes that direct courts of the forum
in certain instances to apply the statute of limitations of a foreign state, part of the
subject of this Article.57
Within limited constitutional bounds on a state’s legislative jurisdiction,58
a state is free to adopt its own rules regarding the proper methods by which to select
between and among conflicting laws. The processes through which states resolve
conflicts between statutes of limitations have generally followed a track laid by the
development of rules governing the choice of substantive law that will govern a
claim. As will be seen in Section III, however, the process of moving from static,
reflexive choice-of-law rules regarding conflicting limitations rules to more nuanced
choice-of-law rules has progressed less broadly and more slowly than the adoption
of those rules as regards matters of substance.
One final note about choice-of-law rules in general: they are forum-based.
Except in the rare renvoi scenario,59 it is only the forum’s choice-of-law model that
matters because it is the forum court that is making the choice. Thus, for the
prospective parties there are two key issues. Which states are available as potential
fora and what choice-of-law methods will those states employ to determine the
governing statute of limitations? Both inquiries are key to the issues raised in this
Article. If a state cannot assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the
limitations period it would choose were it to hear the case may be treated as
irrelevant. If multiple states are available as fora for the resolution of plaintiff’s
claim, plaintiff must make a sophisticated analysis not simply of which state’s

55. The Restatement Second acknowledges both this fact and the consequences of it. “The rules of
Conflict of Laws, and especially the rules of choice of law, are largely decisional and, to the extent that
this is so, are as open to reexamination as any other common law rules.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 1, § 5.
56. Louisiana adopted its statute in 1991. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Bk. IV. Oregon adopted its statue
in 2001. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.360 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); Id. § 15.440. For
an extensive discussion of the scope and effect of both statutes, see HAY ET AL., supra note 51, at 99–104.
57. See discussion infra notes 110–19.
58. See Reese, supra note 2.
59. “Conflicts” people also love French. Renvoi, meaning “send back”, arises when the forum’s rule
chooses the “whole law” of a foreign state, including its choice-of-law rules. A true renvoi, or remission,
is created when the forum chooses the whole law of another state and that state would under the same
facts choose the whole law of the forum. The unattractive result is an unending volley between the two
states. For this reason, choice-of-law rules nearly always choose the local law of another state rather than
the whole law. A recent example is Boutelle v. Boutelle, 337 P.3d 1148 (Wyo. 2014). Plaintiff sought to
avoid the bar to her claim that resulted from Wyoming’s borrowing statute’s choice of Montana’s statute
of limitations by arguing that the borrowing statute should borrow the “whole” law of Montana, which
would choose Wyoming’s statute of limitations. Id. at 1154. The Wyoming Supreme court rejected this
argument. Id. “If we were to apply Montana’s choice of law statutes, those statutes would refer us back to
Wyoming’s law governing the statute of limitations, which presumably would include Wyoming’s
borrowing statute, which would refer us again to Montana law, and so on in a continuous looping fashion.”
Id. at 1154.
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substantive and procedural rules are favorable to her but also of whether that state, if
it were the forum, would choose its own plaintiff-favoring rule or adopt instead a
less plaintiff-favoring rule of another connected state. Properly understood, this is a
powerful tool for the plaintiff and it becomes more or less powerful depending on
the number of choices the plaintiff has regarding fora for her suit, a subject to which
we now turn.
II. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND
CHOICE OF LIMITATIONS PERIODS
A. Expanding Judicial Jurisdiction: International Shoe and its 20th Century
Progeny.
For nearly seventy years, beginning with the United States Supreme Court’s
1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington60 and continuing through the
first decade of the 21st century, the constitutional power of a state to exercise judicial
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant was greatly expanded from that which
existed prior to International Shoe. For the sixty-seven years prior that power was
defined by Pennoyer v. Neff.61 Pennoyer held that the presence in the forum state of
either the defendant or his property was a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction.62 In the Pennoyer era, the only forum for plaintiff’s suit often was the
state where defendant resided unless he ventured outside his state and was served
with process there or owned foreign property. Put simply, plaintiff often did not have
a choice of fora; she had a choice to sue or not sue in the only place where defendant
was constitutionally present. International Shoe expanded the constitutional
connections that a state might have with a nonresident defendant to support the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction over it by introducing the “minimum contacts” test63
as the constitutional standard by which exercises of in personam judicial jurisdiction
by state courts over non-present64 nonresident defendants were to be measured.65 In
contrast to Pennoyer’s insistence on a tangible presence of the defendant, the
minimum contacts standard allowed jurisdiction to be grounded on defendant’s
“contacts, ties or relations”66 with the forum. International Shoe’s contribution to
jurisdictional jurisprudence was additive in that the original grounds of personal or

60. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
61. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
62. Id. at 722.
63. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
64. In-state service of process on a nonresident defendant, without regard to whether the defendant
has additional contact with the forum, continues to provide a constitutional basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
65. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
66. Id. at 319.
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property presence in a state, recognized in Pennoyer, remained sufficient, although
no longer necessary, for the exercise of judicial authority over the defendant.67
In order to satisfy the newly-announced minimum contacts test,
International Shoe required not only the identification of the defendant’s contacts,
ties and relations, but also an evaluation of the quality, nature, and quantitative
substantiality of those links between the defendant and the forum state.68 To aid in
that task the opinion offered a structure for analyzing judicial jurisdiction that
persists to this day. That structure is created by the intersection of two variables. The
first variable distinguishes the defendant’s continuous and systematic contacts with
the forum from single, isolated or occasional ones.69 “A defendant’s continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum are jurisdictionally supportive, although not
determinative, whereas single or occasional contacts are jurisdictionally debilitating,
but not fatal.”70 The second variable examined the “connectedness” of the contacts
and the cause of action. A cause of action “arising out of, or related to” defendant’s
forum acts is jurisdictionally supportive but not determinative.71 A cause of action
that does not arise out of or is not related to defendant’s forum acts is jurisdictionally
debilitating but not fatal.72 While International Shoe does not use the term,
jurisdiction over claims that do not arise out of or relate to defendant’s forum
contacts is now widely referred to as “general” jurisdiction, while jurisdiction over
claims so related is widely referenced as “specific” jurisdiction.73
The two variables identified by International Shoe created four
jurisdictional scenarios into which defendant’s contacts with the forum state might
fall. The first is created when the defendant has continuous and systematic contact
with the forum state and the cause of action arises from that contact, an exercise of
specific jurisdiction. In such cases, judicial jurisdiction “has never been doubted.”74
Correspondingly, where defendant has only single or isolated contacts within the
forum and the cause of action is not related to or does not arise out of that act or acts,
judicial jurisdiction is rejected as laying an unreasonable burden on the defendant.75
The constitutional propriety of a state’s exercise of judicial jurisdiction in
the other two scenarios cannot be determined so directly. In each of these scenarios

67. This would change with regard to in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208
(1977), wherein the Court stated in dicta that the minimum contacts test was to govern all assertions of
state court jurisdiction whether in personam or in rem. Shaffer was reductive in a jurisdictional sense in
that it removed the presence of defendant’s property within the forum as a sufficient contact of the
defendant, folding it instead into the minimum contacts analysis in which it was not sufficient per se.
68. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318.
69. See id. at 317.
70. Patricia J. Youngblood, Constitutional Constraints on Choice of Law: The Nexus Between WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 50 ALB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).
71. Id. at 5–6.
72. See id. at 6.
73. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). The Court’s recent jurisdiction cases adopt the terms. See
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
74. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317. International Shoe itself was such a case as was the Court’s next
judicial jurisdiction case, Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
75. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317.
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there is one jurisdictionally-supporting and one jurisdictionally-debilitating factor.
Where the case involves a cause of action arising out of defendant’s single or isolated
contact with the state, an exercise of specific jurisdiction, the constitutional propriety
of the jurisdictional exercise turns on the quality of defendant’s forum acts.76 Where
the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with the forum but the cause
of action does not arise out of or relate to those contacts, an exercise of general
jurisdiction, International Shoe emphasized that the propriety of the jurisdictional
exercise depends on the quantity of such contacts and suggested that that standard
would be high.77 Nearly seventy years after International Shoe, the United States
Supreme Court, in Goodyear78 and Daimler, 79 discussed in Section IV, would
declare just how high that bar is.
During that seventy years, the Supreme Court added meat to the bones of
the analysis it laid out in International Shoe, sometimes emphasizing the fairness
interests of the plaintiffs,80 more often indicating that it is the defendant’s contacts
that must be the primary focus of the jurisdictional inquiry. In Hanson v. Denckla,81
decided thirteen years after International Shoe, the Supreme Court cautioned state
courts that a state’s interest in hearing a case and the plaintiff’s convenience interests
become relevant considerations in jurisdictional inquiries only after the court has
determined the existence and level of defendant’s purposeful contacts, ties or
relations with the forum.82 Despite Hanson’s admonition, the decades following
International Shoe saw an unparalleled expansion in the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction.83 The United States Supreme Court would note in 2014 that
“International Shoe’s momentous departure from Pennoyer’s rigidly territorial focus
. . . unleashed a rapid expansion of tribunals’ ability to hear claims against out-ofstate defendants when the episode-in-suit occurred in the forum or the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the forum.”84
The great majority of both Supreme Court jurisdiction cases and states’
exercise of jurisdiction involved specific jurisdiction.85 Only two Supreme Court
cases post-International Shoe and pre-2011 called upon the Court to evaluate the

76. Id. at 318. In 1957, the Supreme Court decided McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957), a case presenting this scenario. The defendant sold only one insurance policy in the State
of California and had no other contacts in that state. Id. at 222. The cause of action arose out of that policy.
Id. In upholding California’s jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court noted that the contract had a
substantial connection with California and that the state had a manifest interest in providing a means of
redress for its residents, particularly where the claims were small and distant litigation was burdensome
to the resident plaintiff. Id. at 221.
77. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318.
78. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (discussed infra notes
167–73).
79. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (discussed infra notes 176–91).
80. See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. 220; Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virgina, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
81. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
82. Id. at 251.
83. See Martin B. Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment
on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L. REV. 407–08 (1980).
84. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 128.
85. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 916 (2011).
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standards for general jurisdiction. In one, Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 86
the Court approved the exercise of such jurisdiction; in the other, Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall,87 it did not.
Entering the 21st century, despite occasional efforts by the Supreme Court
to rein in the scope of “minimum contacts,” American states exercised judicial
jurisdiction over defendants who did routine business within their borders whether
or not the cause of action sued upon arose from that business. Not only was specific
jurisdiction rarely rejected, general jurisdiction was widely exercised as well.
B. Expansive Judicial Jurisdiction and Its Impact on Applicable Limitations
Periods: “Egregious” Forum Shopping
As a result of expansive notions of jurisdiction arising out of the limited
contact a defendant was required to have with a state to justify the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction over it, in many cases, especially those involving defendants with
contacts touching many and often all states, the plaintiff had an array of choices
regarding where to bring suit. Once plaintiff made her choice, that forum enjoyed
considerable leeway in choosing to apply its own substantive and procedural laws to
govern the controversies before it.88 A forum’s then nearly-universal choice of its
own laws to govern matters deemed procedural meant that a well-represented
plaintiff could gain a predictable, reliable and often determinative benefit that, while
not necessarily assuring ultimate victory, would subject a defendant to a suit not
possible in other states, with the consequent cost of litigation, pressure toward private
settlement and potential for significant financial liability. The most consequential
and controversial exercise of the power inherent in the forum’s permissible choice
of its procedural law lay in the choice of the forum’s statute of limitations to allow

86. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Perkins involved the State of Ohio’s exercise of jurisdiction over a company
that had continuing contacts with Ohio but those contacts did not give rise to the liability upon which suit
was brought. Id. at 438. Plaintiff’s claims arose out of the defendant’s mining operations in the Philippines,
under whose laws the company had been incorporated. Id. at 439. The issue in Perkins was “whether, as
a matter of federal due process, the business done in Ohio by [Benguet Mining Company] was sufficiently
substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain” the action. Id. at 447. The Court held the
company’s Ohio activities to be sufficiently substantial, noting that the defendant’s president had returned
to his home in Ohio after the company’s mining operations were halted by the Japanese occupation in the
Philippines. Id. at 447–48. He maintained an office in Ohio in which he carried on many of the company’s
affairs, including holding meetings of the board of directors. Id. at 447. The Court found that “[w]hile no
mining properties in Ohio were owned or operated by the company, many of its wartime activities were
directed from Ohio and were being given the personal attention of its president in that State at the time he
was served with summons.” Id. at 448.
87. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). The survivors and representatives of four United States citizens killed in a
helicopter crash in Peru brought suit in Texas state court against a Colombian corporation that provided
helicopter transportation for oil and construction companies in South America. Id. at 409. The
transportation contract was executed in Peru. Id. One of the helicopters providing transportation service
pursuant to this contract crashed. Id. Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action and defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 412. The Court held that defendant’s contacts with Texas
did not rise to a level necessary to support general jurisdiction, noting that defendant did not have a place
of business in Texas and had never been licensed to do business there. Id. at 411. The defendant had made
substantial purchases in Texas and had sent its employees to be trained there but the Court held these
contacts, even if regular, to be insufficient for an exercise of general jurisdiction. Id. at 418.
88. See discussion supra notes 3 and 4.
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prosecution of a suit that was barred by the limitations period of states with closer
connections to the parties and the occurrence or transaction that underlay the suit.89
Two cases in particular serve to illustrate the significance of the forum’s
choice of its own limitations period in this context. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine90
arose out of a suit brought in federal court in New Hampshire by a New York plaintiff
against defendant for libel.91 Hustler Magazine’s only connection with New
Hampshire was its monthly sale of 10,000 – 15,000 copies of its magazine in the
state, a small fraction of its national sales. The lower court dismissed the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction on due process grounds.92 The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed, noting two significant concerns arising out of the law that New
Hampshire would choose to apply should it be permitted to hear the suit. First, New
Hampshire applied a “single publication” rule that authorized an award of damages
arising out of defendant’s sales in all states.93 Second, the court was concerned that
the exercise of jurisdiction by New Hampshire would allow it to choose its statute of
limitations, which was unusually long for libel actions and was, in fact, the only
limitations period among the fifty states that did not time-bar the claim.94 This, of
course, was exactly why plaintiff chose to sue in New Hampshire. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, stating that the concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals
did not defeat jurisdiction that was otherwise constitutionally proper.95 Once New
Hampshire had judicial jurisdiction, it had legislative jurisdiction to choose to apply
its own statute of limitations, even if no other state would permit the suit to proceed.
A second case involving undisguised forum shopping for an open statute of
limitations, less known but arguably more problematic than Keeton, is Schreiber v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp.96 The claim by a Kansas plaintiff for a cause of action arising
in Kansas, against a defendant who shipped its product there, was brought in
Mississippi where the local statute of limitations remained open. Defendant
successfully moved to transfer the case to Kansas where the case would have been
barred if originally brought there. Under federal transfer rules, Mississippi’s
limitations period continued to govern the case “even though (a) Mississippi had no
conceivable interest in the case; (b) the case was to be tried in Kansas, otherwise
under Kansas law; and (c) the case was brought after a period of time almost three
times longer than the Kansas limitations period.”97
There were two avenues to avoid this result, both of which were taken by
the United States District Court in Kansas. One was to find that Mississippi did not

89. As earlier noted, see supra note 4, this power of a state to choose its own law is without limit
with regard to choice of its statute of limitations. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 721 (1988)
(“This Court has long and repeatedly held that the Constitution does not bar application of the forum
State’s statute of limitations to claims that in their substance are and must be governed by the law of a
different State.”).
90. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
91. Federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. §1332 (2012).
92. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772.
93. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 35–36.
95. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775.
96. 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979).
97. Martin, supra note 18, at 409.
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have personal jurisdiction over the defendant and therefore there was nothing to
transfer to Kansas; the other was to read Mississippi law as permitting the choice of
Kansas’ statute of limitations under the unique circumstances of the case. While
sympathizing with the District Court’s desire to avoid what appeared a ridiculous
result, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the
propriety of jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant was doing business in
Mississippi and determining that there was no reason to anticipate that Mississippi
would abandon its commitment to the rule directing choice of its own statute of
limitations.98
Mississippi still has not abandoned that commitment. The avenues by which
other states did, in part to discourage forum shopping, are the subject of Section III.
III. STATE RESPONSES TO FORUM SHOPPING FOR OPEN STATUTES
OF LIMITATION IN THE AGE OF EXPANSIVE JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION
Keeton and Schreiber dramatically illustrate the intersection of broad
concepts of judicial jurisdiction with a forum’s reflexive choice of its own limitations
period. Immediately post-International Shoe, nearly every state chose the governing
limitations period based on the lexi fori rule: all matters of procedure were to be
decided by the law of the forum and the forum’s statute of limitations, being a matter
of procedure, was therefore the governing rule. If the forum’s statute of limitations
remained open, the suit was heard regardless of whether the state whose substantive
law created and governed the claim would foreclose it. If the forum’s statute of
limitations had run, the suit was dismissed regardless of whether the state whose
substantive law created and governed the claim deemed the claim open.
The lex fori rule was a choice-of-law rule that each state chose to adopt. It
was not constitutionally mandated, however, and as the scope of judicial jurisdiction
expanded and the methods used by courts to decide other choice-of-law questions
became less reflexive and more nuanced,99 courts in many states began to question
the wisdom of the lex fori rule.100 Understanding how states now make the choice
regarding the governing limitations rule requires a familiarity with the four general
approaches to choosing limitations periods that states have adopted in the era of
expansive judicial jurisdiction.
A.

Choosing the Limitations Period through Reflexive Reference to the Lex
Fori
Lex Fori as a Forum-Centric Rule

The Restatement of Conflict of Laws (hereinafter First Restatement),
adopted by the American Law Institute in 1934, reflected the then well-nigh
universal practice of American courts in choosing as the applicable source of the

98. Schreiber, 611 F.2d at 794.
99. For an excellent discussion of the shift from traditional to modern theories regarding choice of
law, see Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585 (1985).
100. For a discussion of this criticism see Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412 (N.J. 1973).
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governing statute of limitations, the law of the forum.101 This rule is content neutral
in the sense that it is not concerned with whether the forum’s limitation rule bars or
permits the suit. The First Restatement devoted two sections to the choice of the
forum’s statute of limitations and one section to the only overarching circumstance
where the forum’s statute was not to be chosen. Section 603 stated in full “[i]f action
is barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be maintained
though action is not barred in the state where the cause of action arose,” the state
which was often the source of the law governing the parties’ substantive rights.
Section 604 addressed the opposite situation, stating in full “[i]f action is not barred
by the statute of limitations of the forum, an action can be maintained though action
is barred in the state where the cause of action arose.” Plaintiffs rarely chose to sue
in a state where the statute of limitations had run, unless they had little or no other
choice, and thus section 603 rarely was in issue. Quite the opposite was true of
section 604, in that one of the most common motivations for forum shopping is the
search for a state whose courts remain open to claims that are barred in other, perhaps
more obvious, venues for suit.102 By expressly directing the choice of the forum’s
law, the First Restatement established that a plaintiff who was able to identify a state
with judicial jurisdiction over the defendant and an open limitations period would be
able to resurrect a claim that was barred under the law of the state that created it.103
The lex fori rule continues to be the choice-of-law method employed by a
slim majority of states.104 At the time the rule was initially embraced, the key policy
that supported it was saving the local bench and bar from having to apply rules that
were deemed difficult to discover and interpret without familiarity with the foreign
states’ local practices.105 Of course, not all procedural rules impose such difficulty.
While a particular twist on the admission of hearsay testimony might be difficult to
glean and would require a hiatus in a court proceeding to determine, the discovery
and application of a statute of limitations would be neither difficult nor disruptive.
Modern courts employing the lex fori rule are thus far more likely to describe the

101. RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 17. The First Restatement was largely shaped by its Reporter
Joseph Beale’s embrace of the “vested rights” nature of Conflicts of Law. 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1935). Beale’s vision determined the appropriate source of a given rule in
conflict as determined by a pre-assigned territorial connection. See id.
102. See discussion of Schreiber, 611 F.2d 790 (1979), supra notes 96 and 97.
103. The First Restatement’s third section on statutes of limitations addressed the historical exception
that foreign limitations periods functioning to define rights rather than to limit remedies should be chosen
over conflicting forum limitations periods. See Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904). In such cases,
the foreign limitation was seen as so intimately tied to the creation of the right that it could not be separated
therefrom. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 17, § 605 (“If by the law of a state which has created a
right of action, it is made a condition of the right that it shall expire after a certain period of limitation has
elapsed, no action begun after the period has elapsed can be maintained in any state.”).
104. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2018: Twenty-Third Annual
Survey 1, 65 (2019).
105. At least one author has suggested that the sole justification for the overarching traditional rule
that matters of procedure were to be decided according to the law of the forum was convenience. See
David H. Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY
MOUNTAIN L. REV. 287, 288 (1960) (“Foreign rules of evidence and foreign peculiarities of pleading
would, it is thought, overburden and disrupt the forum’s judicial machinery.”).
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value of the rule in terms of its virtue of certainty and simplicity.106 As courts that
have abandoned the lex fori rule have been quick to note, those virtues are bought at
the cost of any recognition of the competing interests of other states with a much
closer connection to the parties and the transaction or occurrence.107
Understanding the Full Scope of Modern Lex Fori: Borrowing Statutes
While a significant number of states remain committed to the classification
of statutes of limitation as procedural and therefore governed by the rules of the
forum,108 in a large majority of those states, the rules of the forum include
“borrowing” statutes.109 While such statutes differ significantly in the circumstances
that trigger their application,110 all but one of them111 chooses the shorter limitations
period of a foreign jurisdiction with a specified connection to the parties or the
controversy. Thus, only in the circumstances where the forum limitations period
remains open, and the foreign period closed, will borrowing statutes come into play.
This fact alone suggests that the primary goal underlying the enactment of borrowing
statutes was the prevention of forum shopping for a longer limitations period.112 Not
surprisingly, the effect of borrowing statutes is to advance defendant’s repose
interests over plaintiff’s vindication interests.

106. In Berger v. AXA Network LLC, 459 F.3d 804, 810–11 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, examining which choice-of-law model best suggested itself for adoption in cases brought
under § 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006), noted
“[o]ne possible approach would be simply to choose, in every case, the forum state’s law as the source of
the applicable limitations period. The prime advantage of this approach is its simplicity; neither the court
nor the parties remain in doubt concerning which state’s law ought to apply. Certainly, predictability and
ease of administration are factors long recognized in the fashioning of any choice of law tool.”
107. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981); Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So.2d
1112 (Fla. 1987); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 418 (N.J. 1973); see also Martin, supra note
18.
108. See Symeonides, supra note 104.
109. For a list of state borrowing statutes, see Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 3250, 2015 WL 7172485.
110. For a detailed and largely still accurate categorization of the kinds of borrowing statutes enacted
by states, see Vernon, supra note 105 at 294–323. See also Ibrahim J. Wani, Borrowing Statutes, Statutes
of Limitations and Modern Choice of Law, 57 UMKC L. REV. 681 (1989).
111. Oklahoma is the exception and borrows the foreign limitations period whether it is longer or
shorter. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §105 (West, Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of the 57th Legis. (2019)).
112. See, e.g., Juran v. Bron, No. Civ.A. 16464, 2000 WL 1521478, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2000).
New York has long recognized that an additional interest is the protection of residents, Besser v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), aff’d, 552 N.E.2d 171 (N.Y. 1990),
and perhaps of nonresident defendants as well, George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1964). More recently, the New York Court of Appeals embraced a third interest, that of providing certainty
and predictability as to which limitations period New York courts will choose. See Global Fin. Corp. v.
Triac Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482, 485–86 (N.Y. 1999).
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Most borrowing statutes are aimed at the scenario where a claim has
accrued113 outside the forum114 and is barred by the state where it accrued. One
central difference in the effect of the statutes turns on whether they govern only when
the plaintiff is a nonresident of the forum, at the time the cause of action accrued, the
suit was brought, or both.115 Excepting a plaintiff who was or is a resident of the
forum from the borrowing effects of the statute recognizes that such a plaintiff is not
engaged in inappropriate forum shopping.116
Borrowing statutes are forum choice-of-law rules. They operate to borrow
only the limitations period of the foreign state where the cause of action arose. They
do not, however, direct courts to ask what limitations period the foreign state would
choose if the suit were filed there. Put another way, borrowing statutes borrow the
“local” law of the foreign state, not its “whole” law.117 To illustrate, if a nonresident
of New York were to sue in that state on a claim arising in New Jersey, New York
would choose New Jersey’s limitations period if it were shorter than New York’s
even if New Jersey, were it hearing the case, would apply a choice-of-law model
choosing the longer limitations period of another state, including potentially New
York.
Borrowing statutes drastically curtail forum-shopping by nonresident
plaintiffs and thus mitigate the more egregious effects of the traditional rule. In doing
so, such statutes have exchanged the certainty of the rule reflexively choosing the
limitations period of the forum for what is considered a fairer result for the defendant.
As will be seen later in this Article, the existence of borrowing statutes, along with
the function of the more nuanced choice-of-limitations law models discussed

113. One of the major problems with the content of borrowing statutes is that they do not define where
a cause of action “accrues,” leaving to the courts the challenge of that determination. Most courts continue
to apply a reflexive conclusion that very much parallels the First Restatement’s choice-of-law rules for
substantive issues by simply adopting the lex loci delicti, the law of the place of the wrong (most often
the place of the injury), in torts cases and the lex loci contractu, the law of the place of contract formation
or performance, in contracts cases. That is, courts have rejected attempts to tie the operation of borrowing
statutes to complicated issues of which state is the state of accrual, instead assigning accrual to one factual
contact. Those states that have applied a more nuanced view to the question of where the cause of action
accrued for borrowing statute purposes engage in what is, in essence, a dependent choice-of-law analysis
discussed infra notes 137–41. For an excellent analysis of how complicated the accrual issue can be for
borrowing statute purposes, see Braune v. Abbott Labs., 895 F.Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (involving the
question of where claims by daughters of mothers who took an allegedly injurious drug accrued).
114. Courts have also been required to determine the contours of “outside” or “without” the forum. In
Scherer v. Hellstrom, a Michigan appellate court held that the phrase “without the state” in Michigan’s
borrowing statute meant that the action must accrue “without any essential facts giving rise to the cause
of action occurring in Michigan.” 716 N.W.2d 307, 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
115. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, Ch. 758 & L.2020, Ch. 23).
But see Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., Inc., 710 N.E.2d 250, 253–54 (N.Y. 1999) (the New York Court of
Appeals held that although § 202 did not apply to plaintiffs who were state residents, New York choiceof-law analysis directed application of a Connecticut statute of repose to a Connecticut law claim brought
by a New York resident).
116. See Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp., Buick Motor Div., 473 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1984) (stating
that the “primary purpose” of the New York borrowing statute “is to prevent forum shopping by a
nonresident seeking to take advantage of a more favorable Statute of Limitations in New York”).
117. See Reese, supra note 2.
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immediately below, has the effect of limiting the vindication of plaintiff’s rights in
multistate cases where such rights would be protected in a purely domestic case.118
B.

Choosing the Limitations Period through the Revised Restatement
Second Model

The Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws was published by the
American Law Institute in 1971.119 In many respects it represented a sea change in
the legal view of conflicts of law. The Restatement Second adopted vast changes in
the rules that had been embraced by the First Restatement in overarching and directed
ways. In the place of the “vested rights” theories that had pervaded the First
Restatement,120 the Restatement Second announced broad choice-of-law principles
by reference to which most conflicts decisions were to be made.121 Additionally, in
a wide range of areas it announced a “most significant relationship” test that was to
be the standard by which individual choice-of-law decisions were to be reached in a
number of substantive areas. The Restatement Second made no change, however, to
the Restatement First rules regarding the choice of limitations periods. The
Restatement Second devotes two sections to choice of law regarding statutes of
limitations. The first, section 142, addresses the two conflict possibilities regarding
the forum’s limitations period, that it is shorter than that of another state and that it
is longer than that of another state. In both cases, it chooses the lex fori, exactly the
First Restatement’s result.122
The general refocus of the Restatement Second away from vested rights and
toward a more nuanced choice-of-law approach was widely welcomed by courts and
commentators. 123 The specialized rules regarding statutes of limitations were not.
While commentators were generally comfortable with the Restatement Second’s
choice of the forum limitations period, when that period was shorter than that of
other states whose laws might have been chosen, they were decidedly not so as to
those more common cases where the forum’s limitations period was longer than the
period of other connected states.
There was a clearly emerging trend by the middle of the 1980s to reject the
Restatement rule selecting the longer lex fori limitations period in circumstances
where the sole connection of the forum to the case was that plaintiff had chosen to

118. See Section V infra.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1. The Restatement Second was widely adopted by
American states, especially as the choice-of-law model that is to be employed to choose the substantive
law that will govern the issues in the case.
120. See discussion supra note 101.
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 6.
122. The other statute of limitations section, Restatement (SECOND) § 143, adopts the right/remedy
exception recognized in the First Restatement § 605, see supra note 103, stating that if the state creating
the claim bars “the right and not merely the remedy” it is that state’s limitations period and not the
limitations period of any other state, including the forum, that governs.
123. See Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 486 (1991) (measured by its acceptance by courts the Restatement Second was a
“smashing success”).
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sue there.124 In response, the American Law Institute published a revision of section
142 in 1988. The Revised Restatement Second model for choosing limitations
periods has now been directly adopted by eight states.125
Under Revised section 142 (1), where the forum’s statute of limitations bars
the claim, that bar is to be applied “unless the exceptional circumstances of the case
make such a result unreasonable.”126 Such exceptional circumstances might exist
“when through no fault of the plaintiff an alternative forum is not available as, for
example, where jurisdiction could not be obtained over the defendant in any state
other than that of the forum.”127 The most common scenario where this would occur
is where the only alternative fora are outside the United States.128 In such case,
assuming that the forum would not suffer significant harm to its docket interests if it
heard the case, choice of a longer foreign statute of limitations is appropriate.
Revised section 142(2) addresses the circumstance where the forum’s
statute of limitations has not run such that the claim is timely under forum law. This,
of course, is the forum shopping context. Again, the Restatement favors the choice
of forum law, offering only one scenario that would appropriately lead the forum to
choose a statute of another state to bar the claim. This scenario arises when no
significant interest of the forum is served by allowing the claim to proceed and a
state with a more significant relationship to the parties and transaction or occurrence
bars the claim.129 Both facets must be met; thus, if the forum’s hearing of the case
124. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305
A.2d 412 (N.J. 1973).
125. See Symeonides, supra note 104, at 66 (Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Ohio and West Virginia).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1986 Revisions, Supp.
3). For a case involving a conflict between Massachusetts or Rhode Island’s limitations period in which
the court concluded that such exceptional circumstances did not exist, see Shamrock Realty Co. v.
O’Brien, 890 N.E.2d 863 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1986 Revisions,
Supp. 3).
128. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (discussed infra notes 160–64).
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1986 Revisions,
Supp. 3).The significance of the language of § 142(2) allowing rebuttal of the lex fori presumption if the
forum is uninterested and another state that bars the actions has a more significant relationship to the
parties and the occurrence is illustrated in Jackson v. Chandler, 61 P.3d 17 (Ariz. 2003). All of the parties
in the case were California domiciliaries; the accident occurred in Arizona. Id. at 17–18. Arizona’s
limitations period remained open at the time of suit in Arizona; California’s had closed. Id. at 18.
Arizona’s lower courts, focusing only on the connection of the two states with the parties, concluded that
the §142(2) exception should apply. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed noting that, while California
had the more significant relationship with the parties, Arizona had the more significant relationship with
the occurrence. Id. at 21. Since the foreign period trumped the forum period only where the forum had no
interest and a less significant connection to both the parties and the occurrence, the presumption that the
lex fori applied was not overcome. Id. For a case holding that the presumption is overcome, see MTK
Food Serv., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 189 A.3d 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). A Pennsylvania
plaintiff sued an attorney practicing in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for malpractice in a New Jersey
court. Id. at 915. The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint was that defendant had failed to file plaintiff’s
claim against its insurer within the applicable statute of limitations and thus the claim was lost. Id.
Ironically, the subsequent malpractice action involved the question of whether it too was barred by the
passage of time. Id. Pennsylvania’s limitations period had closed; New Jersey’s remained open. Id.
Section 142 presumptively favored choice of New Jersey’s limitations period because New Jersey was
the forum. Id. at 917. The trial court had held that this presumption was not overcome because New Jersey
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advances a significant interest of the forum, that longer limitations period is properly
chosen even if a state with a more significant relation to the litigation would bar it.130
The Comments to Revised Restatement Second section 142 identify this as posing a
decisional difficulty because the forum often has some interest that is served by
hearing the claim but application of its longer statute would undermine the interests
of another state that had closer connections to the parties and transaction. “One such
situation is where the domicile of the plaintiff is the state of the forum and that of the
defendant is in the other state with the most significant relationship to important
issues in the case.”131 The Comments suggest that “the forum should only entertain
the claim in extreme and unusual circumstances.”132 Most courts faced with this
juxtaposition, however, will choose to apply the forum’s statute and allow the suit to
proceed.133 In such a case, the plaintiff is not a forum shopper; she is a forum resident,
and the impact of her injuries is felt in and by the forum state.134
The American Law Institute is in the process of drafting a third Conflicts
Restatement. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is considering a recast of section 142’s rules
on choice-of-limitations periods. Draft section 5.29 articulates a general rule that,
unless exceptional circumstances make the choice unreasonable, when the forum is
entertaining a claim based on foreign law, it will apply the law, whether forum or
foreign, barring the claim unless maintenance of the claim in the face of a foreign
bar would serve a substantial interest of the forum.135 Comment b acknowledges that
this rule will generally track the result reached by borrowing statutes.136 Section 5.29
does not directly recognize a different rule for resident and nonresident plaintiffs.137
Significantly however, Comment b states the following: “Although the plaintiff’s
status as a forum resident might be relevant to determining whether maintenance of
the claim serves a substantial interest of the forum . . . it will usually not by itself be

had a substantial interest in a case involving an attorney licensed to practice there. Id. at 918. The
Appellate Division reversed, noting that the only pertinent contact with New Jersey was that defendant
was licensed to practice law and had an office there, contact that “falls short of establishing a substantial
interest for New Jersey to apply its statute of limitations.” Id.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (AM. LAW INST. 1986 Revisions, Supp.
3).
131. Id. § 142 cmt. g.
132. Id.
133. See id. An example is Nierman v. Hyatt Corp., a case involving a Massachusetts citizen who was
injured in a hotel in Texas. 798 N.E.2d 329 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). The court acknowledged that Texas
had the more significant interests in the substantive issues presented. Id. at 332. As to the limitations issue,
when the forum had the longer limitations period, docket concerns are not an issue since “from the
perspective of the forum State, the claim is not too stale to be fairly adjudicated.” Id. Note that this rule
essentially reaches the same outcome as a borrowing statute that allows the longer limitations of the forum
to be chosen if the plaintiff is a forum resident. See discussion supra note 115.
134. Nierman, 798 N.E.2d 329. See also Weitz Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 266 F. Supp.2d 984
(S.D. Iowa 2003) (although all of the underlying transactions occurred in Connecticut and thus
Connecticut law governed the substance of the claims, the court applied Iowa’s longer statute of
limitations to a claim brought in federal court in Iowa by an Iowa citizen).
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, (AM. LAW INST. Preliminary Draft No. 4
(Oct. 10, 2018)) (hereinafter Restatement (Third) Preliminary Draft No. 4).
136. See discussion of borrowing statutes supra notes 108–17.
137. See discussion supra note 115.
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enough to excuse compliance with a foreign limitations period.”138 Unquestionably,
section 5.29, if ultimately adopted by the American Law Institute and later by courts,
will favor the repose interest of the defendant over the vindication interests of the
plaintiff significantly more often than does the current Revised Restatement Second.
C.

Choosing Statutes of Limitations through Dependent Choice-of-Law
Analysis

In 1982, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
adopted the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act (UCLLA),139 which rejected
the traditional characterization of statutes of limitations as procedural rules to be
drawn from the lex fori and announced a rule that would, in nearly all cases, adopt
as a source of the limitations period the law that governs the substantive issues in the
case. Section 2 of the UCLLA provides generally that, if a claim is substantively
based upon the law of another state, the limitations period of that state applies.140
Section 4 provides the single exception to the section 2 rule and governs when the
limitations period of the state chosen by section 2 is substantially different from the
forum’s limitation period and either does not afford the plaintiff “a fair opportunity
to sue”141 or imposes on the defendant an “unfair burden” in defending the claim, in
which case the forum is to apply its own limitations period.142 UCLLA is agnostic as
to what the appropriate substantive choice of law model should be. Six states have
enacted UCLLA.143
The crucial feature of UCLLA and the one that results in here characterizing
the analysis it directs as a dependent choice-of-law analysis, is that the choice of the
limitations period is, in most cases, compelled by the choice of the governing
substantive law. That law governs the limitations period even if the facts would
otherwise strongly suggest that it should be governed by the law of another state
more interested in the limitations issue with the result that UCLLA can compel a
choice that does not reflect the limitations concerns of any state. Consider this
scenario: Two domiciliaries of State A are injured in a traffic accident in State B with
a truck owned by a company incorporated in State C and driven by a domiciliary of
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Preliminary Draft No. 4, § 5.29 cmt. b. (emphasis added).
139. UNIF. CONFLICT OF LAWS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 56 (2015).
140. Id. § 2.
141. For example, a state that has adopted a six-year limitations period for contracts actions might
hold that a foreign one-year limitations period is not only substantially different than the forum’s rule but
operates in the given case to undermine the plaintiff’s vindication interest by failing to provide a fair
opportunity to sue.
142. UNIF. CONFLICT OF LAWS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 56.
143. See MINN. STAT. § 541.31 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. and First Spec. Sess.); MONT.
CODE ANN. 27-2-503 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3203 (West, Westlaw
through Second Reg. Sess. of the 106th Legis. (2020)); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01.2-02 (West,
Westlaw through 66th Gen. Assem.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.430 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assem.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.18.02(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1
of the 2020 Reg. Sess.). Arkansas repealed its enactment of UCLLA in 1999. Colorado’s enactment has
been ruled superseded by the state’s later adoption of a borrowing statute. See Jenkins v. Panama Canal
Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238 (Colo. 2009) (finding the choice of law rules in UCLLA and the state’s borrowing
statute irreconcilable and choosing the borrowing statute to foreclose the suit because it was enacted after
Colorado enacted the UCLLA).
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State D. The plaintiffs sue in State A, their domicile, which has adopted UCLLA.
The action is timely under the limitations periods of State A, C and D; it is barred
under the limitations period of State B. Because the underlying claim in negligence
is governed by the law of the state where the cause of action accrued, here State B,
the limitations law of that state is chosen to bar the claim. If the choice-of-limitations
question were severed from the choice of the substantive law, State A’s law would
likely have been chosen as State A has a vindication interest, the limitations periods
of States C and D were still open and therefore defendants’ domiciles had no interest
in their repose interests, and State B’s repose and docket interests were not at play
as the defendants were from State B and it was not the forum.144
D.

Choosing Statutes of Limitations through Independent Interest Analysis

“Interest Analysis,” writ large, is a modern choice-of-law approach,
grounded in the work of Professor Brainerd Currie,145 to govern substantive choiceof-law issues. At least seven states have adopted governmental interest analysis to
determine the governing limitations period where a conflict exists.146
A court applying interest analysis147 identifies the contacts of the parties and
the transactions or events with each of the states whose rule might be chosen and
asks whether the policy148 behind that rule is “triggered” by the contact. If it is, the
state has an “interest’ in having its rule applied and the rule remains one of the
choices; if it is not, the state does not and the rule is no longer a choice. If two or
more states have an “interest,” a “true” conflict is presented. An example in the
context of limitations periods would involve a forum in which defendant is a
domiciliary with a closed limitations period barring the claim and a foreign state with
connections to the plaintiff and the occurrence or transaction whose limitations
144. See Cropp v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 880 P.2d 464 (Or. Ct. App.1994). States, A, B, C and D were
respectively Oregon, California, Washington and Nevada. See id. at 464. The majority barred the claim
under California’s one-year statute of limitations period. Id. at 466. The dissent conducted an analysis of
the limitations issued divorced from the substantive choice of law and concluded that California had no
interest in limiting plaintiffs’ suit and Oregon’s vindication interest in applying its then-open two-year
limitation should prevail. Id.
145. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 57–58 (1963).
146. They are Arkansas, California, Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 2017: Thirty-First Annual Survey, 66 Am.
J. Comp. L. 1, 66 (2018). For an excellent explanation of interest analysis as applied to conflicting statutes
of limitations, see Milhollin, supra note 35.
147. This will definitionally be a court of the forum. See discussion supra note 59. The significance
that it is the forum weighing the interests is well-illustrated by Greer v. Academy Equipment Rentals, No.
C94 0120 CAL ARB (FSL), 1994 WL 443421 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 1994). Two California plaintiffs sued
two Nevada defendants in California for injuries arising out of an automobile accident in Nevada. Id. at
*1. California’s one-year limitations period had run; Nevada’s two-year period had not. Id. The court,
while acknowledging Nevada’s vindication interest in the application of its limitations period in favor of
its citizens, chose California law finding California’s repose and docket interests to be stronger. Id. at *5.
148. The burden is on the party who is arguing that a state interest is triggered to convince the court
that the interest is in fact an interest that motivated the state to adopt the rule in question. See e.g., Indus.
Indem. Co. v. Chapman & Cutler, 22 F.3d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff offered no evidence that
Illinois adopted a longer statute of limitations in order to regulate the Illinois bar therefore the fact that
the defendant was a member of the Illinois bar did not trigger the state’s interest in application of its longer
statute of limitations).
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period remained open. The forum would have docket and repose interests triggered
by its contacts; the foreign state would have vindication and deterrence interests
triggered by its contacts.149 According to Currie, such a conflict should be resolved
by choice of forum law.150 Dissatisfaction with that outcome has led courts to apply
instead either a “greater interest” or a “comparative impairment” test to choose
between interested states.151 If only one state has an “interest,” there is a “false”
conflict and that state’s rule is chosen.152 This would arise where the claim arose in
a state that has a closed limitations period and the state of the common domicile of
the parties, the forum, has an open period, such that only the latter state would have
an interest. The foreign state’s interest in its shorter statue is not triggered under these
facts.153 A suit where neither state has an interest is an “unprovided-for” case.154 An
example in the choice-of-limitations context is a forum state, home to the defendant,
with an open limitations period and a foreign state, home to the plaintiff and site of
accrual, with a closed limitations period. Assuming that the forum has disclaimed a
deterrence interest, its interests in its longer period would be triggered by either a
forum plaintiff or a forum accrual, neither of which is here. Likewise, the foreign
state’s interest is not triggered if its rule was adopted to protect its docket and its
defendants. Currie favored choice of the forum’s law in such a case.155
All of the above methods of choosing limitations periods, including the lex
fori rule when the state has a borrowing statute, permit or require the forum court to
choose the limitations law of a foreign state. As this section illustrates and Section
V will amplify, the new methods of choice tilt strongly toward an outcome that gives
149. See id. at 1350.
150. See supra note 145.
151. This approach does not ask which state has a greater interest in choice of its law, but rather which
state would suffer the more serious legal, economic and social harm if its rule were not chosen. See
Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana’s New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 677, 690 (1992). For a discussion of the two approaches, greater interest and comparative
impairment, see Indus. Indem. Co., 22 F.3d 1346.
152. See Mahne v. Ford Motor Co., 900 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1990). This case involved a conflict between
a Florida period that was closed and a Michigan period that was open. Id. at 84–85. Plaintiff was a
Floridian injured in Florida. Id. at 84. The suit was brought in Michigan based on general jurisdiction over
Ford. Id. The district court chose Florida law to bar the suit; the Court of Appeals reversed, applying
Michigan law and finding that Florida had no docket or repose interests and that Michigan had a deterrence
interest in regulating manufacture within the state. Id. at 85, 88.
153. See Cropp v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 880 P.2d 464 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (discussed supra note 144).
Another case presenting a “false” conflict is Dindo v. Whitney, 429 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), an action
arising out of a Quebec car accident involving residents of Vermont and New Hampshire. Id. at 25. The
statute of limitations of Quebec, whose law would have governed issues regarding the conduct of the
defendant, had run; the statute of limitations of New Hampshire, where the defendant resided had not. Id.
Clearly applying an interest analysis, the court found that Quebec had no interest in the choice of its statute
as the parties had only a fortuitous relationship with the province and the province’s limitations period
was intended to protect its citizens and its courts from “stale” claims. Id. at 26. New Hampshire’s interests
were triggered to the extent that New Hampshire had determined that its citizens should be subject to suit
for a designated period of time, presumably even if the plaintiff was not a New Hampshire resident,
especially because the limitations period of Vermont, plaintiff’s state of residence, also had not run. Id.
See also Baldwin v. Brown, 202 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (to the same effect).
154. See CURRIE, supra note 145, at 152.
155. Unprovided-for cases are rare if only because courts are inclined to find state interests if there is
a state policy that will allow them to do so. See HAY ET AL., supra note 51, at 733.
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the repose interest more weight than the vindication interest. Most often, these
methods were adopted to prevent or at least curtail forum shopping. In Section IV,
the Article turns to the recent jurisdiction jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that,
in effect, directly limits forum shopping by withdrawing all but a few fora from the
market.
IV. MCINTYRE, GOODYEAR, DAIMLER AND BRISTOL-MYERS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRICTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In a span of six years, from 2011 to 2017, the United States Supreme Court
decided four cases156 that substantially curtailed the scope of constitutionallypermissible exercises of personal jurisdiction, returning that scope to one closer to
Pennoyer157 than to International Shoe,158 at least with respect to corporate and other
business-entity defendants It is not the purpose of this Article to criticize or praise
the Court’s opinions: other academic scholars have effectively done both.159 The
purpose here is to describe briefly the effect of each case on a state’s power to hear
a plaintiff’s claim and, in the next section, to explore how the modern constriction
of personal jurisdiction interplays with modern limitations choice-of-law models to
subsume protection of the plaintiff’s vindication interest in favor of the defendant’s
repose interest.
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v. Nicastro160 came to the Court on relatively
straightforward facts. Plaintiff, a citizen of New Jersey, brought a products liability
suit against defendant after a machine sold to plaintiff’s employer by the sole United
States distributor of defendant’s products allegedly caused plaintiff serious injury.
Plaintiff’s injury occurred in New Jersey where his employer, a New Jersey
company, operated its plant. Defendant was an English company that desired an
American market for its machines and sought that market through a separatelyowned national distributor and through regular attendance at trade shows in the
United States. None of these trade shows were in New Jersey nor was the distributor
156. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011);
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). The Court decided two other cases on
jurisdiction during the period, supra note 16. Because the constriction of personal jurisdiction that
occurred during this period can be fully explained by reference to the four cases, the others are not
discussed here.
157. See discussion supra notes 61 and 62.
158. See discussion supra notes 63–77.
159. Examples of thoughtful articles analyzing the Court’s modern jurisdiction jurisprudence include:
Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts
Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1246, 1263 (2011) (describing McIntyre as “quite possibly the most
poorly reasoned and obtuse decision of the entire minimum contacts era” and Goodyear as “not nearly as
bad”); Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (arguing
that the disaggregation of claims due to the Supreme court’s constraints on personal jurisdiction “causes
waste and unfairness to the parties and the [legal] system”); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth
Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499, 499 (2018) (arguing that the Supreme court is
“radically changing existing law while claiming to follow controlling precedent”); Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 207, 211 (2014) (predicting that Daimler will “significantly shift the balance of power in
civil litigation”);.
160. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
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located there. The New Jersey courts upheld jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
reversed. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion began by noting the excessive reach of
state courts which he characterized as “[f]reeform notions of fundamental fairness
divorced from traditional practice.”161 The Court then proceeded to narrow that reach
by limiting jurisdiction to those circumstances “where the defendant can be said to
have targeted the forum.”162 It would no longer be enough, as a general rule, “that
the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”163 In
the plurality’s view, defendant targeted the United States but did not specifically
target New Jersey. As to the need cited by the New Jersey Supreme Court for a New
Jersey plaintiff to have access to a convenient forum, the plurality concluded that
any interest of the plaintiff and the State of New Jersey must yield to the liberty
interests of the defendant.164
Should the plurality’s “targeting” test be adopted by a majority of the Court
in a future case, the impact on the constitutional standards for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant will be significant. The targeting test will curtail those
contacts between a defendant and a state that can constitutionally “count.” Limiting
the contacts that are cognizable for this purpose has consequences for both variables
of International Shoe.165 First, to the extent that certain contacts of the defendant
with the forum do not count, the quantity of defendant’s contacts are reduced,
potentially resulting in the recharacterization of what might be argued to be
continuous and systematic contact to single, isolated and occasional contact, or, as
in McIntyre, to no contact at all. Second, removing connections of the defendant with
the forum state from the constitutional count may result in the litigation being
unconnected with defendant’s constitutionally-cognizable contacts with the forum.
Thus, declaring actions or activities of the defendant as uncountable for minimum
contacts purposes potentially undermines a finding that the two jurisdictionally
supporting factors, quantity and connectedness, exist.
Had the Supreme Court found the contact of McIntyre with New Jersey to
be constitutionally cognizable, the case would have involved an exercise of specific
jurisdiction.166 The second of the four cases curtailing personal jurisdiction,
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown,167 involved an exercise of

161. Id. at 880.
162. Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 889. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment. See id. at 887. He opined that the case easily
could have been decided according to existing precedent and that the announcing of a “targeting” test was
unnecessary. Id. at 890 (Breyer, J. concurring). Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor,
dissented. See id. at 893 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Where the plurality focused primarily on sovereignty
concerns as the hallmark of proper jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg focused the jurisdictional inquiry more
squarely on fundamental fairness not simply with regard to the defendant but with regard to the litigants.
Id. at 903 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Was it not fair, she asked, given an international seller’s business
goal of increasing its market in the United States, to require that seller to defend in a state where its
products caused an injury? Id. at 906 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165. See discussion supra notes 68–73.
166. The cause of action would arise out of McIntyre’s tires being present in the state, a presence that
would have been constitutionally recognized for jurisdiction purposes.
167. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). Goodyear was heard and decided on the same day as McIntyre, 564 U.S.
873.
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general jurisdiction. Again, the facts were straightforward and largely uncontested.
Plaintiffs were families of two teenage boys from North Carolina who died in a bus
accident in France while travelling with their soccer team. Plaintiffs alleged that the
accident occurred because of a defect in the bus tires and sued, among others, the
Turkish subsidiary of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, a United States
corporation, that had manufactured the tires. The case was one of general jurisdiction
because, although the Turkish and other Goodyear subsidiaries sold tens of
thousands of tires in North Carolina, the particular tires alleged to have failed were
not sold there.168 The North Carolina courts found the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant constitutionally authorized based on the subsidiaries’ continuous and
systematic sales in the state.169
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Ginsberg, the author
of the McIntyre dissent. The issue presented was whether “foreign subsidiaries of a
U.S. parent corporation [are] amenable to suit in a state court on claims unrelated to
any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State.”170 The Court found the facts of
Goodyear much closer to those of Helicopteros,171 than to those of Perkins.172 In
differentiating Goodyear from Perkins, the Court noted that defendants “are in no
sense at home in North Carolina.”173 Significantly, the Court opined that, while the
presence of a domiciliary plaintiff might strengthen the constitutional footing of an
exercise of specific jurisdiction,174 fairness concerns surrounding the plaintiff played
no role in evaluating the constitutionality of exercises of general jurisdiction over the
defendant.175
Goodyear, standing alone, is the least significant of the four cases discussed
in this section. While its ultimate conclusion that the foreign subsidiaries were not
subject to general jurisdiction in North Carolina was predictable, two questions
deserve mention here. The first, discussed in more detail later in this Section, is the
reference to general jurisdiction being present in Perkins because the defendant was
“at home” in the forum. Was the notion of being “at home” simply an observation or
was it the standard for determining a constitutional minimum? If the first, it was
inconsequential; if the second, it suggested that general jurisdiction would exist in at
most two states, regardless of the quantity of defendant’s business activity in other
states. Second, where plaintiff is a forum domiciliary, why is the vindication interest
of plaintiff and his state not entitled to some, though not determinative, weight in a
general jurisdiction analysis?
The third and by far most consequential of the cases here under review is
Daimler AG v. Bauman.176 Daimler was a general jurisdiction case brought in
168. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., 564 U.S. at 921.
169. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S. A., 564 U.S. 915.
170. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., 564 U.S. at 918.
171. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (discussed supra note
87).
172. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (discussed supra note 86).
173. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., 564 U.S. at 929.
174. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (discussed supra note 76).
175. See id. at 224.
176. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
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California federal court177 under the Alien Tort Claims Act,178 the Torture Victims
Protection Act of 1991,179 and various state statutes by Argentinian residents against
DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (Daimler), a German corporation,180 alleging
that defendant’s wholly-owned Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes Benz Argentina
(MB Argentina) had collaborated with Argentinian security services to kidnap,
torture and kill plaintiffs or their relatives who worked for the subsidiary during
Argentina’s “Dirty War.”181 Jurisdiction over the suit was argued to be
constitutionally permissible based on the contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
(MBUSA), a subsidiary of Daimler that was incorporated in Delaware and had its
principal place of business in New Jersey. Given the lack of connection between
MBUSA’s California contacts182 and the plaintiffs’ claims, all parties and the courts
treated the case as one involving the exercise of general jurisdiction.183
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Ginsberg, who had
also authored Goodyear,184 held that the Due Process Clause precluded California’s
exercise of general jurisdiction because MBUSA was not “essentially at home in the
forum state.”185 Goodyear had hinted that such a “home” link was necessary for
general jurisdiction; Daimler cemented that necessity.
With regard to individual defendants, the place where they are at home is
their domicile.186 With regard to corporations and like business entities 187 that place
is the state of incorporation or the principal place of business.188 “Those affiliations
have the virtue of being unique—that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place—
as well as easily ascertainable.”189 Somehow that is described as a benefit to plaintiffs
as “[t]hese bases afford [them] recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in
which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims.”190
Daimler ultimately answered the question left open by the gulf in years and
circumstances between Perkins and Helicopteros. It confirmed what had been hinted
177. As a general rule, federal courts follow state law to determine the scope of their jurisdiction over
persons. See id. at 753; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). California’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of
jurisdiction to the full extent that it is permissible under the U.S. Constitution. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
ANN. §410.10 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
179. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
180. Daimler is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany and manufactures Mercedes Benz vehicles in that
country. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 121.
181. Id.
182. Those contacts were multiple California-based facilities and the sale of luxury vehicles to the
California market. Id. at 123. The California sales amounted to 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales. Id.
183. Id. at 127.
184. See discussion supra notes 167–73.
185. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)).
186. Id. at 760 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., 564 U.S. at 924).
187. While Daimler involved a corporate entity, the same rule would apply to any statutorily-created
entity, including limited liability companies.
188. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
189. Id.
190. Id. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment because she believed the exercise of jurisdiction
under the unique circumstances of the case was unreasonable despite the presence of sufficient contacts
of the defendant with the forum. See id. at 142 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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at in Goodyear. For this, it at least had the salutary effect of making clear exactly
how high the bar is set for the exercise of general jurisdiction. The effect of the
decision on plaintiffs’ efforts in seeking judicial vindication for their injury cannot
be overstated. While not completely reverting to the jurisdictional construct of
Pennoyer, the outcome and reasoning of Daimler brought general jurisdiction much
closer to the strict territorial focus of that case than to the broader grounds of
International Shoe. The court itself acknowledged this. “Specific jurisdiction has
been cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway, but we have declined to stretch general
jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally recognized.”191
The final case, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California,192
called for the Supreme Court to address what was meant by International Shoe’s
“arising out of” or related to193 language that distinguishes specific from general
jurisdiction. In Bristol-Myers, in excess of 600 plaintiffs, most of whom were not
California residents, sued Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), a Delaware corporation
headquartered in New York, for injuries allegedly arising out of their use of Plavix,
a BMS drug. BMS had numerous business contacts in California but it did not
manufacture Plavix in the state. If did, however, sell Plavix there taking in over $900
million from in-state sales, a figure that represented just over one percent of its
nationwide sales revenue. The California courts originally held that the state had
general jurisdiction over all the claims based on BMS’s extensive business activities
there,194 but after Daimler required rejection of general jurisdiction in any state other
than the state of incorporation or principal place of business, the California courts
reconsidered the case as an exercise of specific jurisdiction.195 The California
Supreme Court, in upholding specific jurisdiction, stated that the wide-ranging
nature of BMS’s contacts within the state permitted the exercise of specific
jurisdiction because the claims of nonresidents were similar to the claims of
California residents, over whom specific jurisdiction was not contested. In essence,
the California high court found plaintiffs’ causes of action to be sufficiently “related
to” defendant’s forum contacts although they did not “arise out of” them, and thus
permitting the exercise of specific jurisdiction.196
The Supreme Court reversed in an 8-1 decision. In order to exercise specific
jurisdiction on constitutionally permissible grounds, in the Court’s opinion, “there
must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’”197
Because all of the conduct giving rise to the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims occurred
outside the state, California could not claim specific jurisdiction.198

191. Id. at 132 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
192. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
193. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
194. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1779.
197. Id. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., 564 U.S. at 919).
198. Id. Justice Sotomayor dissented, finding both legal and practical problems with the majority’s
reasoning. Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The legal weakness lay in the fact that it treated claims
by nonresident plaintiffs that the defendant conceded were “materially identical” to the claims of resident
plaintiffs as not sufficiently connected to the defendant’s substantial connections with the forum state to
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The collective effect of the Court’s opinions in these four cases sharply
restricted the kind of contacts that could be counted toward the constitutional
minimum,199 defined specific jurisdiction more narrowly,200 significantly limited the
contours of constitutionally-permissible general jurisdiction,201 and recalibrated the
balance of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” announced in
International Shoe.202 By 2018, the contours of judicial jurisdiction looked very
different than they had in the previous seventy-five years.
V. LIMITATIONS CONFLICTS IN THE POST-DAIMLER AGE
What is the consequence of the extensive curtailment of judicial jurisdiction
in the post-Daimler age with regard to the choice of the applicable statute of
limitations to either bar or permit the suit? If one posits that the choice of fora in
which to sue is reduced to one between the exercise of specific jurisdiction in the
state in which the cause of action arose,203 what will here be called the locus causae,
and the exercise of general jurisdiction in the place of incorporation or principal place
of business (here called the locus domicilii204) there is either a consequential choice
sustain the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Id. at 1785 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority,
Justice Sotomayor would characterize the plaintiff’s claims as clearly related to the defendant’s contacts
with California. Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “All of the plaintiffs—residents and nonresidents
alike—allege that they were injured by the same essential acts. Our cases require no connection more
direct than that.” Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor saw the exercise of jurisdiction as
reasonable not only with regard to defendant’s activities in California but also with regard to the plaintiffs’
and the state’s interest in hearing the case there. Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). As to the practical
consequences, they were, in Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, potentially dire. “Especially in a world in which
defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in only a handful of States, the effect of today’s opinion will
be to curtail—and in some cases eliminate—plaintiffs’ ability to hold corporations fully accountable for
their nationwide conduct.” Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
199. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
200. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
201. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
202. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
203. I am intentionally conflating specific jurisdiction and “the state where the cause of action arose”
for the unique purposes of this section. In all other respects they are not synonymous. A state may have
specific jurisdiction and not be the place the cause of action arose. Specific jurisdiction only requires an
“affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at
1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., 564 U.S. at 919). A court could have specific
jurisdiction in a contracts case based on the fact the contract was signed there. The cause of action will
not arise, however, until there is a breach, which would likely be at the place of performance.
Correspondingly, it is possible that jurisdiction cannot be had under current constitutional constraints even
in the place where the cause of action arose, as when a plaintiff unilaterally brings defendant’s product
into a state with which defendant has not affiliated and the product causes injury there. In this Section’s
discussion it is assumed that the forum exercising specific jurisdiction is the place where the cause of
action arose. As has historically been true with borrowing statutes, a state adopting the choice-oflimitations-law model proposed here will define for itself where the cause of actions arose. See discussion
supra note 113.
204. Locus domicilii in this context simply refers to the place where defendant is “at home” in Daimler
terms; that being the place of residence or domicile of in individual defendant and the place of
incorporation or the principal place of business for business entities. For purposes of this discussion, the
place of incorporation and the principal place of business will be treated as having not necessarily the
same length of limitations periods but limitations periods that are both open or both closed.
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between the two or there is not. If there is a consequential choice, it is because one
permits the suit to proceed and the other does not. The discussion below examines
the two broad scenarios wherein a conflict between the limitations period of the two
states with personal jurisdiction arise. Scenario One posits that the limitations period
of the locus causae remains open and that of the locus domicilii has closed; Scenario
Two posits the opposite.
A.

Scenario One: The Limitations Period of the Place the Cause of Action
Arose (the Lex Causae) is Open and the Limitations Period of the
Defendant’s Domicile (the Lex Domicilii) is Closed.

Scenario One defines the conflict of law but does not itself designate which
state is the forum. Let us begin by assuming that plaintiff would prefer to sue in the
state with an open limitations period, here the locus causae. That forum will be
required to make a choice between its open limitations period and the closed
limitations period of the locus domicilii. How that choice is made depends upon the
choice-of-law model that the forum has adopted to make it. If the forum is one of the
slight majority of states that still characterizes limitations periods as procedural,205
the choice will be of the lex fori and the suit will proceed. Even if such a state has a
borrowing statute,206 that statute will only apply where the cause of action accrues in
a foreign state:207 a fact not present here. If the forum has adopted the Revised
Restatement Second analysis,208 the forum will presumptively apply its own rule
under section 142(2), which here will allow the suit to proceed. The presumption of
choice of the lex fori is overcome under this rule only when no significant interest of
the forum is served by allowing the claim to proceed. Here, the forum has a clear
interest in choice of its longer limitations period because the cause of action arose
there and the forum’s deterrence interest is thereby triggered.209 If the forum has
adopted UCLLA, choosing the limitations period of the state whose law governed
the substantive claims at issue, the choice presumptively would be of the place where
the cause of action arose, the forum here, because that state is most often the source
of the governing substantive law.210
The most complicated analysis will be required where the forum is a state
that engages in an independent interest analysis, directly analyzing each state’s
interest in the choice of its limitations rule unmoored from the choice-of-law analysis
with regard to the substantive claims.211 Here, the court will explore whether each of
the states has an interest in the choice of its limitations period. Defendant’s domicile,
having legislated a relatively shorter limitations period that benefits both local courts
and local defendants will clearly have a triggered interest in the choice of its rule for
the latter purpose. What of the interest of the forum in choice of its longer period?
Striking the balance of interests of the litigants and local courts in favor of a longer
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See discussion supra note 104.
See discussion supra note 109.
See discussion supra note 114.
See discussion supra note 124.
See Jackson v. Chandler, 61 P.3d 17 (Ariz. 2003) (discussed supra note 129).
See discussion supra notes 139–44.
See discussion supra notes 145–55.
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limitations period generally serves two goals, vindication and deterrence. Where the
plaintiff is not a domiciliary of the forum, the first interest is not implicated by the
choice of the plaintiff to sue there because courts have generally chosen a domicilecentric view of such interests, characterizing them as triggered only when a forum
domiciliary has suffered injury.212 The second interest, deterrence, would seem to be
clearly served in this instance as the very activity that caused plaintiff’s injury or
damage is, at the least, tangentially related to the forum. If both states have a
governmental interest in the choice of their rule, the forum will normally choose its
own rule as forum courts are instrumentalities of the state itself and thus
presumptively charged with applying duly-enacted or adopted forum rules where the
very policies sought to be achieved by those rules are advanced thereby.
The following is a proper summary of the outcomes the parties may expect
where the limitations period of the place where the cause of action arose is longer
than the limitations period of the state of defendant’s domicile and the plaintiff sues
in the former. First, there are no legitimate concerns regarding forum shopping as it
is a rare court that would find suit in the place where the tort occurred or the contract
was breached to be improperly strategic. Second, no matter which choice-of-law
model the forum court has adopted with respect to choosing between limitations
periods, the forum is likely to choose the lex fori, whether that choice is mechanical
or nuanced, and allow the suit to proceed. Thus, where the lex fori and lex causae
are the same and set a longer limitations period than that of the lex domicilii¸ the
vindication interests of the plaintiff prevail.
Of course, plaintiff’s choice of forum often is driven by a multitude of
personal and strategic litigational factors. Might a plaintiff who finds advantage in
suing in defendant’s domicile have any hope of that forum choosing the longer
limitations period of the locus causae? Here, the outcome will turn on the choice-oflaw model employed by the forum. A lex fori forum will choose its own shorter
period to bar the claim. It will do so, even if it has enacted a borrowing statute
because such statutes will borrow only foreign limitations periods that are shorter: a
fact not present here.213 A Revised Restatement Second jurisdiction is highly likely
to do the same. A forum that is the domicile of the defendant will have an interest in
applying its shorter limitations period based both on both repose and docket interests
that underlie its shorter period. An independent interest analysis jurisdiction will
apply the lex fori as a bar for the same reasons as were described when the forum is
the locus causae.214 Both states have policy interests triggered by the connections of
the parties or the claims with them thus creating a true conflict most often resolved
by choice of the forum’s law. Only in states that have adopted UCLLA does the
plaintiff have a realistic hope of displacement of the forum’s limitations bar as those
states presumptively apply the limitations period of the state whose law will govern
the underlying substantive claim, the lex causae.
In summary, unless the forum has adopted UCLLA, plaintiff has virtually
no hope of defendant’s domicile choosing the foreign period to allow the suit to

212. See, e.g.¸ MTK Food Servs., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 189 A.3d 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2018) (discussed supra note 129).
213. See discussion supra notes 110–12
214. See discussion supra notes 210–12.
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proceed. Where the limitations period of the locus causae is longer than that of the
locus domicilii, plaintiff’s choice of fora is thus reduced to one, the locus causae.
The above analysis has examined the relevance of only two of the three
possible interested states: the forum, which here is the place where the cause of action
arose, and the state of defendant’s domicile. It has not examined the possible
influence of the limitations rule in the place of plaintiff’s domicile.215 The fact that
plaintiff’s state may not be constitutionally permitted to exercise judicial jurisdiction
over the defendant216 does not directly disqualify plaintiff’s state from being the
source of the governing rule or from influencing the choice among two other rules.
Indirectly, however, that is exactly the effective result whether plaintiff brings suit
in the locus causae or in the locus domicilii. In the broad scenario under examination
here, where the lex causae offers a longer limitations period than defendant’s
domicile, introduction of plaintiff’s domicile rule will create one of two situations.
Either the plaintiff-domicile limitations rule, like that of the lex causae, remains open
or, like that of the lex domicilii, has run. In either case, little changes in the choiceof-law analysis described above. For those states that mechanically or presumptively
apply the lex fori, the choice will be of the forum’s rule regardless of the rules of the
parties’ domiciles. UCLLA states will presumptively apply the lex causae and
nothing in the common view of the domiciles of the parties is likely to overcome that
presumption.217
Independent interest analysis will change the approach to making the rule
choice but is not likely to change the outcome. If one of the interests behind the
locus-forum’s adoption of a longer limitations period is to allow that period to serve
as a deterrent to defendant’s injurious conduct or activity in the state, this interest is
triggered by the fact that the cause of action arose there. Plaintiff’s domicile’s interest
in the choice of its longer limitations period is triggered by the domicile link of the
plaintiff. The coincidence of these two sovereign interests in the choice of a longer
limitations period strengthens the forum’s interest.
The more complicated choice-of-law issue arises when plaintiff’s and
defendant’s domiciles both have enacted limitations periods that bar the particular
suit being brought under the open period of the forum-locus. Significantly, from a
choice-of-law perspective, the fact that the two parties hale from different domiciles
is not relevant if the outcomes of the rules of the different domiciles are the same.218
The parties in this instance will be considered as sharing a common domicile. In a
jurisdiction that hews to the traditional rule, the open period of the locus-forum
would be chosen. Restatement Second analysis will presumptively choose the longer
period of the forum unless the forum has no interest in application of its limitations
period, a conclusion not appropriate here. UNCLLA and dependent interest analysis
will presumptively choose the lex causae regardless of the rule at plaintiff’s domicile.
215. It should be noted, however, that very often the plaintiff’s domicile is the place where the cause
of action arose and therefore plaintiff’s interest are often directly in play in the choice of law analysis.
See, e.g., George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1964).
216. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011); J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011).
217. See discussion supra notes 139–41.
218. Such rules will be deemed the “same” if they both bar the action under the circumstances of the
case, regardless of whether read in isolation they are not identical.
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Again, it is forum states that apply an independent choice-of-law analysis
to the limitations issue that are most likely to calibrate the balance differently in this
context. The fact that the “common” domicile rule of plaintiff and defendant’s states
have chosen a limitations period that elevates the significance of repose over
vindication increases considerably the strength of the sovereign interest in having
the bar applied even in the face of the locus-forum’s deterrence interest. If the locus
causae does not reflexively choose its own law in cases where, as here, a “true”
conflict is presented, it might defer to the stronger interest of the two domiciles in
choice of their limitations and bar the suit. 219
B.

Scenario Two: The Limitations Period of the Defendant’s Domicile (the
Lex Domicilii) is Open and the Limitations Period of the Place the Cause
of Action Arises (the Lex Causae) is Closed.

Scenario Two arises when the statute of limitations in the locus domicilii is
longer than that of the locus causae and the former remains open while the latter has
closed. As in Scenario One, in the absence of defendant’s consent to suit in another
state, the plaintiff’s post-Daimler choice will be among the locus exercising specific
jurisdiction and defendant’s domicile or principal place of business exercising
general jurisdiction. Here, plaintiff’s presumptive choice will be of the state whose
limitations period remains open, defendant’s domicile.
Depending on the choice-of-law model for limitations periods adopted by
the locus domicilii, plaintiff will often find that the forum’s open limitations period
is rejected and the closed period of the locus is chosen to bar the suit. A true lex fori
forum will apply its local limitations period to allow the suit. If, however, that forum
is one of the great majority that has enacted a borrowing statute, the forum is likely
to reject its longer limitations period in favor of the shorter period of the locus,
especially if plaintiff is a nonresident.220 A Revised Restatement Second court will
presumptively choose the lex fori, but if that law incorporates a borrowing statute,
the suit will be foreclosed, as the borrowing statute forms part of the lex fori. A
UCLLA or dependent choice jurisdiction will choose the shorter period of the locus
as the state whose law is most likely to govern the substantive claim.
As is true with Scenario One, the states that engage in an independent
analysis of the limitations issue require a more targeted analysis of the sovereign
connections and interests at play. Applying an interest analysis, the forum is most
likely to find only one “interested” state, the locus state, and thus a “false conflict”
leading to choice of the locus rule to bar the suit.221 Recall that a state adopting a
longer limitations period does so either to protect the vindication interests of
219. Some states will make a broad distinction in their choice-of-law models between choices
involving loss-allocating rules, that is, rules that allocate loss resulting from admittedly tortious conduct,
and those involving conduct-regulating rules that conflict on the required standard of conduct. See Schultz
v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684–85 (N.Y. 1985) (holding charitable immunity rules to
be loss-allocating). Where a choice involving a conflict of loss-allocating rules is presented, courts will
apply the law of the common domicile rather than the law of the locus. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner,
286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (N.Y. 1972) (establishing a rule designating the common domicile as the source of
law regarding loss-allocating rules). Statutes of limitations are loss-allocating rules.
220. See discussion supra notes 109–15.
221. See discussion supra notes 150–52.
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plaintiffs or to deter injurious conduct by defendants. As noted, it is certainly possible
that a state could take an inclusive view of these interests, and some states have,222
incorporating a vindication concern for nonresident plaintiffs and a deterrence
concern with respect to resident defendant’s conduct or activity outside the state.
Most courts presented with the opportunity to so define state interests have adopted
a significantly more insular view, holding that the state is concerned only with its
resident plaintiffs and only with respect to activity within its borders that causes
harm.223 In such case, the domicile has no interest in choice of its law because neither
its vindication nor its deterrence interests are triggered. What of the interest of the
locus state in application of its shorter limitations period? Here is where the analysis
becomes challenging. The locus does not have a docket interest as it is not the forum.
The locus does not have a repose interest as the defendant is not a domiciliary of the
locus. Thus, the locus has no interest in the choice of its law. This is an “unprovided
for” case.224 While it is possible that the forum would choose its own law and let the
case proceed, it is more likely that a court will favor the interests of its domiciliary
by choosing the foreign law and close its doors to plaintiff’s claims, especially if the
law of plaintiff’s domicile would do so as well.225
In summary, where plaintiff might have some optimism at finding that the
state of defendant’s domicile, one of the few options open to her as a fora for her
suit, has an open limitations period, that optimism will be short-lived. While plaintiff
can hardly be charged with egregious forum shopping in choosing the state of
defendant’s domicile, the limitations choice-of-law rules designed to prevent such
forum shopping likely will bar her suit even where defendant’s domicile has made
the sovereign choice to favor vindication and deterrence interests over repose
interests.
Suppose in this instance that plaintiff chose to sue in the locus, despite its
closed limitations period, with a faint hope that the locus might choose the lex
domicilii and hear the suit. Nearly all of the choice of law models will choose the bar
of the lex fori either by virtue of the fact that it is the law of the forum or by virtue
of the fact that it is the law of the locus. The traditional rule, a borrowing statute, the
Restatement Second and UCLLA analysis all lead either strictly or presumptively to
choice of the locus-forum bar. Independent analysis does so as well, as only the
forum will have an interest in application of its law. As noted above, assuming a
narrow insular view of the interests underlying its longer period, defendant’s
domicile has no interest in the vindication interests of a foreign plaintiff or the
deterrent interests surrounding a foreign injury. Here, however, the forum has a
docket interest in choice of its shorter rule and therefore is likely to choose it. Again,
the vindication interest reflected in the lex domicilii falls, this time to the docket
interests of the forum.
What is the significance in Scenario Two of the limitations rule of plaintiff’s
domicile? For the position of the plaintiff’s domicile to be influential, the forum must
222. See, e.g., Mahne v. Ford Motor Co., 900 F.2d 83, 88 (6th Cir. 1990) (discussed supra note 150);
DeLoach v. Alfred, 960 P.2d 628, 631–32 (Ariz. 1998) (discussed supra note 39).
223. See, e.g., Greer v. Acad. Equip. Rentals, No. C94 0120 CAL ARB (FSL), 1994 WL 443421 at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 1994).
224. See discussion supra note 154.
225. See discussion supra note 155.
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be willing to meld the interests underlying the plaintiff-domicile rule with the
interests of the other states. Plaintiff’s domicile rule will either be open or shut and
thus will coincide with either the lex causae or the lex domicilii. Assume the
plaintiff’s domicile limitations period, like that of the defendant’s domicile, remains
open. If defendant’s domicile as the forum maintained strict adherence to the
traditional lex fori rule, the suit would be heard. It is far more likely, however, that
the forum has enacted a borrowing statute. That statute would choose the shorter
period of the place where the claim accrued, the locus, to foreclose the suit. The most
interesting issue in this regard is presented if the forum’s borrowing statute, like that
of New York and California,226 does not borrow a shorter limitations periods for
plaintiffs who are forum residents at the time of accrual. Assuming that plaintiff was
not a forum resident at that time, a facile answer is that the borrowing statute will
apply and bar the suit. If, however, the rule introduced above that treats domiciliaries
of different states whose limitations periods both remain open as essentially codomiciliaries, an argument can be made that the plaintiff was and is, in the law’s
eyes, a domiciliary of the forum, thus falling under the exception. This would appear
to be the only circumstance, an unlikely one, where a nonresident plaintiff could
avoid the operation of a borrowing statute barring her claim.
Would the interests of the plaintiff’s domicile in choice of its longer
limitations rule fare any better under the other choice theories? Revised Restatement
Second would favor the choice of the forum’s law, permitting the suit unless the
forum had no interest in choice of its law or a state with a more significant
relationship barred the suit. Here, the defendant’s domicile well might define its
interest as only favoring resident plaintiff’s and thus find no interest under these
facts. If it desired to choose the lex causae to bar the claim, it would then have to do
so by finding that that state had a more significant relationship to the suit because
the transaction or occurrence was centered there. UCLLA/dependent analysis would
presumptively choose locus law, choosing forum law only if the locus rule was
judged significantly unfair to the interests of either plaintiff because it was too short
or the defendant if it was too long.
Independent interest analysis might offer hope to plaintiff to the extent that
the forum embraced the common domicile rule with regard to loss-allocating issues,
including statutes of limitations.227 In a state that has adopted the common-domicile
rule and extends it not only to where the plaintiff and defendant share a domicile but
also to where the plaintiff and defendant hale from different domiciles that share a
common rule or outcome, the court might very well find the limitations law of the
forum entitled to greater if not presumptive weight. Otherwise, plaintiff’s vindication
interests again are subordinated.
VI. RESURRECTING THE VINDICATION INTEREST IN THE AGE OF
CONSTRICTED JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
As Section III describes, the modern trend of choice-of-law rules regarding
the selection of conflicting limitations periods has intentionally favored choice of a
shorter statute of limitations. Although those rules were largely motivated by
226. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, Ch. 758 & L.2020, Ch. 23).
227. See supra note 223.
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concerns that a plaintiff was egregiously forum-shopping for an unconnected state
with an open limitations period, the presumedly unintended effect of the morenuanced rules was to favor the repose interest of the defendant over the vindication
interest of the plaintiff in cases where forum shopping was not present.
In light of Daimler, and the other cases that have significantly constrained
states’ exercise of both specific and general jurisdiction, inappropriate forum
shopping by the plaintiff is no longer possible. The Supreme Court has so confined
the “market” that there are limited places for the plaintiff to “shop.” Choice of any
one of the available fora today cannot be fairly labeled “forum shopping” in any
pejorative sense.228 Suit in a state exercising specific jurisdiction is constitutional
only if the defendant has acted within or targeted the state and the cause of action
arises out of that action or targeting. No court has held that plaintiff’s decision to sue
in such a state is an inappropriate strategic choice. Neither would plaintiff’s choice
be inappropriately strategic if it were the state of defendant’s “home,” especially in
light of the Supreme Court’s designation of such a choice as not only appropriate but
mandated in the general jurisdiction context.
How could and should the law respond to a legal outcome that was
supported by significant policy goals in the past when those goals have been made
obsolete and perhaps subverted by more modern legal developments? While there
are narrow avenues for either parties229 or courts230 to advance the vindication
interest, this Article proposes a more straightforward, overarching rule that
intentionally returns consideration of the vindication interest to center stage. The
rule, one of alternate reference, is this: if the limitations period of either the locus
causae or the locus domicilli is open at the time the plaintiff files suit, the forum will
presumptively choose that period and allow the plaintiff’s claim to proceed. The
forum is to do so regardless of which state’s limitations period is open. The
presumption may be overcome only upon a showing that the open period is
significantly longer than the forum’s such that forced recognition of the longer period
seriously undermines the forum’s docket interest. For reasons described below, in
light of constrained judicial jurisdiction, the defendant’s repose interest is entitled to
no weight under the proposed rule.

228. As a practical matter, “forum shopping is inherent in any setting where independent sovereigns
co-exist, and each one of them exercises its prerogative to adopt laws that reflect its own preferences.”
Wani, supra note 110, at 691. A plaintiff with any choice of forum, even a limited one, forum shops. A
defendant seeking to displace plaintiff’s choice is, in a sense forum shopping as well.
229. Where the parties are associated prior to the wrong, as in contracts cases, they might contract
around the choice-of-law rules through a choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clause. For a description of
the roadblocks recently undermining the success of such efforts, see Reyhan, supra note 47, at 1247–48.
230. Courts could advance the vindication interest by manipulating the results of the current rules by
defining where the cause of action accrued to avoid a borrowing statute, defining contacts of the parties
such as to fall within the exception to the Revised Restatement, or so defining state interests such that
only the interests of the state with the open limitations period is triggered. Courts regularly engage in such
manipulation which doubtless led to the observation that “of all the factors that may affect the outcome
of a conflicts case, the factor that is the most inconsequential is the choice-of-law methodology followed
by the court.” Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1994: A View “From
the Trenches”, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995). Professor James Martin made the same observation: “Thus
there is always a temptation to concede the general desirability of a limitations principle while seeking to
avoid its application to a particular case.” Martin, supra note 18, at 405.
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We saw in Section V that where suit is brought in the locus causae and that
state has a longer, open statute of limitations, the forum is likely to choose its rule
under all choice-of-law models.231 Although the rule here proposed would not
change the outcome in those cases, it would make the process of reaching that
outcome straightforward and consistent. Where the locus/forum has the longer
statute, the only exception recognized in the proposed rule would not come into play
as the forum is simply choosing its own limitations rule that has been legislatively
determined not to impact docket interests negatively.
The proposed rule would change the outcome as well as the analysis in
situations where plaintiff chooses to sue in the locus domicilii even in the face of its
shorter limitations period.232 Here, the forum would be obliged to choose the open
limitations period of the locus causae, unless that period is significantly longer than
the forum’s limitations period. At first glance, the proposed rule would appear to
undermine both the docket interest of the forum and the repose interest of the
defendant. But how deeply does the rule in fact threaten these interests? Remember
that the basis of the docket interest is the notion that a court should not be required
to hear claims it deems stale.233 Where the lex causae is not significantly longer,
however, asking the forum to hear the case in light of the sister state’s vindication
and deterrence interests would hardly seem to threaten the sovereign interests of the
forum.234 It has long been established that state courts cannot constitutionally close
their doors to claims created by other states simply on the ground that they are not
local.235 Thus, states regularly hear and decide claims that would not be recognized
under their local law. The docket interests of the forum would certainly be served by
not hearing those claims, but it is hardly to be argued that the constitutional mandate
to hear them has somehow undermined the sovereignty of the forum or crippled its
judicial system. The rule proposed here would not do so either. As a practical matter,
the difference between the two limitations periods, while creating a conflict, is
unlikely to be such that the evidence at play is truly stale or that witnesses’ memories
have been drastically reduced or altered.236 While the forum may prefer not to hear
the case, it is highly unlikely that doing so will impose a serious burden on it.237

231. See discussion supra notes 205–10.
232. See discussion supra notes 212–14.
233. See discussion supra note 27.
234. See Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1050 (N.J. 2012) (noting that differences in
limitations periods do not implicate the fundamental public policies of the involved states).
235. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1951) (holding unconstitutional Wisconsin’s refusal
to hear a suit grounded on Illinois’s wrongful death statute).
236. As Professor Weinberg has pointed out, opening the courthouse doors would simply “let the trier
of fact evaluate late blooming claims and long memories.” Weinberg, supra note 33, at 687.
237. That the sovereign interests of the forum in its limitations period are not seriously undermined
by a rule requiring the forum to open its courts to a foreign claim is reflected in a 1945 statement of the
Supreme Court that “[s]tatutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather
than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles.” Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S.
304, 314 (1945). Further, the fact that in all jurisdictions the bar of the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense such that a defendant not only is permitted to waive it but also will be held to have
waived it by failure to raise the defense in defendant’s first responsive pleading undermines the forum’s
docket interest.
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The repose interest of the defendant also would not be undermined by the
adoption of the proposed rule. Denying repose to a defendant based solely on the lex
causae hardly works an unconscionable burden on the defendant, especially since
that state was at least theoretically available to the plaintiff as a fora and, if chosen,
would have heard the suit. Allowing the plaintiff’s suit to go forward in the locus
domicilii when it could have been brought in the locus causae may not be to
defendant’s litigational advantage, but that fact alone should not prevent the hearing
of a claim that remains open at the place creating it.
What of cases where the longer limitations period is that of the locus
domicilii and not of the locus causae and suit is brought in the former? As explained
in Section V, this scenario is one where the modern approaches to limitations
conflicts have decidedly favored choice of the shorter period. The proposed rule
would do exactly the opposite.238 What then would be the effect of the proposed rule
on the interests of the locus causae and the locus domicilii? Shorter limitations
periods are typically undergirded by docket and repose interests. Where the shorter
period is that of the lex causae and the suit is brought in the locus domicilii, neither
of these interests are undermined. The locus causae is not the forum and therefore
docket interests are not triggered.
The defendant is by definition affiliated with the locus domicilii, whose
limitations period is longer, and therefore repose interests are not triggered.
Somewhat ironically, the state that might most object to the proposed rule in this
context is the locus domicilii despite the fact that it is its limitations period the
proposed rule chooses. The decision of the locus domicilii to enact a relatively-longer
limitations period was presumably to favor the vindication interests of plaintiffs and
to deter injurious behavior by defendants. The proposed rule would not permit states
to “localize” those interests by defining the sovereign interest as only directed to
resident plaintiffs or at defendants acting within the state.239 Rather, the rule would
mandate that states adopting it apply their longer limitations periods for the benefit
of resident and nonresident plaintiffs alike and to hear cases arising out of allegedly
injurious actions of those defendants “at home” in their states regardless of where
those injurious actions occurred. The reason for this inclusive evaluation of a state
interest was well stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
We have never taken the parochial attitude that the health and
safety of our State’s citizens are of greater concern or worth than
the health and safety of citizens of another state. Our national
compact and our interstate system suggest that we should treat the
citizens of other states as we treat our own. It would make little
sense, if we were to find that New Jersey had a substantial interest
in the maintenance of a lawsuit, to discriminate against an out-of-

238. Note that the exception to the proposed rule will never be at play here. That exception would
allow a court to close its doors when the limitations period chosen by the proposed rule is significantly
longer than the forum’s limitation period. Here, the limitations period to be chosen under the rule is that
which the forum has enacted.
239. See discussion supra at notes 220–25.
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state plaintiff whose lawsuit was filed within our limitations
period.240
Put simply, the proposed rule insists that defendants who are protected by
jurisdictional rules directing litigation to their “home” not escape the value
judgments of that state by arguing that they should somehow not be thought of as
being “at home” when they acted.241
Finally, how are the limitations interests supported or undermined if
plaintiff chooses to bring suit in the locus causae and that state is required to choose
the longer limitations period of the lex domicilii? To a significant extent, the interplay
of interests in this scenario is the same as that examined above where the longer
litigation period is that of the locus causae and suit is brought in the courts of the
locus domicilii. Here, the forum’s interests are docket and repose focused. The repose
interest is removed simply because the lex domicilii has removed it. The docket
interest exists but should be resolved in the same manner as suggested when the
states and laws are reversed. Only when the forum can show that there is a significant
difference in the two periods, such that the “staleness” of the case would pose a
serious threat to the forum’s docket interests, should that interest be given weight.
The exception to the proposed rule recognizes and permits this.
A final point regarding the rule here proposed; it stands in stark contrast to
the rule currently under consideration in the draft Restatement Third of the Conflict
of Laws. As noted in Section III, that rule would presumptively choose the rule that
bars plaintiff’s claim, regardless of whether that shorter rule is sourced in the forum
or a foreign state and regardless of whether plaintiff is a resident of the forum or
not.242 Such a rule is decidedly focused on defendant’s interest in repose, where the
rule proposed here is decidedly focused on plaintiff’s interest in vindication.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has noted that “[f]ew areas of the law
stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of
periods of limitations.”243 Ease of application is but one value, however; fairness and
a just result ought to be valued as well.244 The rule proposed here, that the forum
choose the longer statute of limitations where two limitations periods are in conflict,
advances all of the above values. Where newly-constrained judicial jurisdiction
clearly favors fairness to the defendant over the interests of the plaintiff or the forum
state, adoption of the rule here proposed will allow choice of law in the limitations
context to advance the fairness interest of the plaintiff in a manner that does not
threaten the repose interests of the defendant or the docket interests of the forum.

240. McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 153 A.3d 207, 224 (N.J. 2017).
241. For the point that a defendant can hardly claim unfair surprise when the law of its domicile is
chosen, see Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317–18 (1980); Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065,
1072 (9th Cir. 1981).
242. See discussion supra notes 135–38.
243. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (quoting Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
244. See McCarrell, 153 A.3d at 210.
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Judicial jurisdiction and choice of law share much of the same DNA,
grounded as they are in broad notions of due process and fairness. Judicial
jurisdiction focuses on the process that is due defendants, but choice of law is
motivated by broader considerations that take into account a fair process for both
litigants. During the height of the International Shoe era, it was noted that “given the
recent great expansion of permissible bases for judicial jurisdiction, it is imperative
that choice of law rules take proper account of the relevant policies of states other
than the forum.”245 The choice-of-limitations-law models adopted in that era did just
that. They no longer do, nor do other models now seriously being considered. In the
age of Daimler, it is the model proposed here that will “take proper account” of the
interests of other states, of defendants, and of plaintiffs to reach a just and fair result.

245. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW 92 (3d ed. 1986).

